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i,
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 6 and Local 7, IUMSWA, AFL-CIO
OPINION

and
Bath Iron Works

AND

AWARD

Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company have the right to implement
any or all of its Substance Abuse Policy?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
In deciding the foregoing issue, the Union and Company
stipulated and agreed that the Arbitrator should decide the
following as well:
1.

The arbitrator should decide the Unfair
Labor Practice charges which cover both
the original and the revised substance
abuse policies.

2.

The Unions and the Company differ as to
whether random testing is before the
arbitrator, either for a determination
on the merits as a part of the arbitration or for determination as part of an
Unfair Labor Practice charge.

3.

The parties request that the arbitrator,
regardless of his decision on the Unfair
Labor Practice aspect or aspects of the
matter, proceed to decide on the merits
underlying questions presented.

Hearings were held on May 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 and 16,
1986, at which time representatives of the above-named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record of the
hearings was taken; and the Union and Company filed post-hearing
briefs and reply briefs.
The General Propriety of a Substance
Abuse Policy and Procedures
The Company builds, repairs and refurbishes fighting and
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support ships for the United States Navy.

The United States Navy,

can withdraw or not place work with a contractor employing personnel who use illegal drugs or controlled substances.
The members of one of the Unions involved herein work
primarily in skilled classifications.

They weld, fabricate metal,

deal with complex plans and other production drawings, and handle
heavy machinery and specialized equipment under conditions that
could be dangerous if their mental and physical capacities are
impaired.

Considering the nature of the Company's product, the

importance of quality and quality control is manifest.

My author-

ized observation of the work in progress has led me to conclude
that the Company relies heavily on the abilities and individual
responsibility of these skilled employees to maintain the quality
of their work.

Indeed, many of these employees perform their craft

duties separately or singly, as distinguished from traditional
mass production typical of the factories of other industries.
This Arbitrator accepts the view that the use of illegal
drugs or controlled substances whether "hard drugs" such as
cocaine, heroin, LSD or the lesser proscribed marijuana, can, depending on quantity and the user's metabolism, cause impairment
of mental and physical capabilities.

It cannot be seriously dis-

puted that use of illegal drugs and substance abuse have become a
national affliction with the gravest of consequences to the health
welfare and productivity of our society.

Indeed it probably is

one of the most tragic and perplexing problems we have ever faced.
Unhappily the State of Maine, apparently like all other states,
has not escaped the affliction, especially with regard to the
possession and use of marijuana.
has the Company escaped.

Nor, from the record before me,

This is not to say that the use of

illegal drugs is widespread among Company employees.

It is not.
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Indeed there is little probative evidence of the use of or addiction to the so-called "hard drugs."

Nor, apparently, is there

wide-spread job related use of marijuana.
indicates some.

But the evidence

High Navy officials report that they have ob-

served incidents of marijuana smoking on the job.

Certain em-

ployees have reported to the Company the use of marijuana on the
job by some employees.

Some employees have registered positive

for the presence of marijuana in Company administered urine tests.
Under these circumstances, I consider it proper and appropriate for the Company to take steps to protect its work contracts; to protect the quality of its products; to protect the
safety of its employees; and to protect its productive integrity
and general reputation by having a policy and program designed
to eliminate or

reduce the possession and use of illegal drugs

in the work place, and the off-property use when such use adversely affects the employee's job performance.
It should be noted that while marijuana has been decriminalized in Maine, its possession and use in proscribed quantities
remains an "offense," and, together with the "hard drugs" is still
an illegal substance.
That only a relative handful of employees may be using
drugs, including marijuana, does not mean that there is not
legitimate reason for a substance abuse policy and program.
purpose of the instant Policy

One

is prophylactic, designed to stop

and discourage what use presently obtains, and to prevent its
proliferation.

That is a legitimate objective.

I am not persuad-

ed that a condition must become extensive or chronic before

1.

Overwhelmingly, this case has dealt with marijuana as the
example of substance abuse.
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management may make a response and seek a remedy.

An employer

may have policies and regulations which for example, prohibit
excessive absenteeism, theft, insubordination, falsification of
records and fighting, without first showing a prevalence of those
activities.

So too with regard to substance abuse.

Therefore I

consider the evidence regarding absenteeism at the Company, and
any proximate relationship to the use of drugs to be immaterial
one way or the other.

Rather, considering all the foregoing, I

find that in the instant case, a substance abuse policy and its
purposes are sufficiently job related to the work and employment
setting of the Company to meet the "job related" requirement of
an enforceable work rule or condition.
The Original and Revised
Substance Abuse Policies
I respectfully decline to decide the propriety of the "original substance abuse policy."

That Policy has not been install-

ed or implemented by the Company.

It has been pre-empted and

superceded by the revised Policy.

It is the latter which the

Company has put into effect, and it is the provisions of the latter which are in dispute and which were adjudicated in this arbitration.

In short, the question of the original policy simply is

not a justiciable issue at this time.

If the original policy is

ever effectuated and implemented, its propriety can then be tested
and determined.
Random Testing
I rule similarly regarding whether the use
ing" for drugs is before me.

It is not.

of "random test-

The Company expressly

withdrew random testing from the procedures of the Revised Substance Abuse Policy and Procedures.

Random testing is not being

done and the Company has stated that it has no present plan to
introduce or require random testing.

Again, that matter is not
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now a justiciable dispute.

The parties have not jointly vested

me with the authority to render a "declaratory judgment" on that
question, and absent mutual agreement on that authority Arbitrators should not venture into declaratory judgments on the request
of one side.

As stated before, if and when random testing is

used, it will be a grievable and arbitrable matter for the Union,
and the rights of the parties in that event, are expressly reserved.
May the Revised Substance Abuse Policy and
Procedures be legislated and implemented by
the Company unilaterally, or are they a "condition of employment" within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Acts, as amended,
requiring bilateral bargaining?
Absent random testing for drugs, and against the backdrop
of the pre-existing and continuing Company Rules and Regulations
Nos. 18 and 19, I do not find that the Revised Policy and Procedures require bilateral bargaining under Sections 8(a)(5), 8(d)

or 9(a) of the Act.
I so conclude because, contrary to the Union's assertion,
I do not find the Revised Policy (as written, and as interpreted
and modified by reference later in this Decision) to be a substantial or significant departure from Rules 18 and 19.
18 and 19 read:
18.

Use, possession, distribution, sale,
or offering for sale, of narcotics,
dangerous drugs including marijuana
or alcoholic beverages on Company
premises at any time.
First Offense:

19.

DISCHARGE

Being on Company premises under the
influence ofalcohol, narcotics, or
dangerous drugs including marijuana,
or refusing to submit to a test administered by the Medical Department
to determine if under such influence.
First Offense: 5 days off.
Second Offense: DISCHARGE

Rules

-6-

Those rules were not bilaterally bargained but rather unilaterally promulgated by the Company, and actively enforced,
over a period of time.

The Unions have not and do not in this

proceeding challenge the propriety, effectiveness or validity of
those Rules.

Indeed, there is no question that those two Rules

have been accepted by the Unions.
As I see it, the Revised Policy makes explicit, provides
particularization and methodological implmentation of managerial
authority, that was and is implicit in Rules 18 and 19 standing
alone.
Under Rules 18 and 19 the Company had the implicit right,
under proper, relevant and reasonable circumstances to utilize
methods to determine for example, if and when an employee did
the proscribed acts of either or both Rules.

To do so, I have

little doubt that the Company may conduct investigations, use
medical tests, and, in the most sensitive area, to make its own
initial determinations, without expressed standards or guidelines,
on whether an employee was "under the influence" of the proscribed substances.

Indeed, though the carrying out of these implicit

rights for the purpose of enforcing Rules 18 and 19 may be
challenged by grievances and arbitration, the Company has uncharted leeway in its initial inquiries and determinations, creating presumptions which the Unions may find difficult to rebut.
By contrast, the Revised Policy, delineates the means, methods,
procedures and standards that the Company will (and must) follow,
and in some specific respects (including the modifications I make
in this Decision) may be more protective of the due process
rights and privacy considerations of the employees than Rules
18 and 19 standing alone.

If the prescribed methods, standards

and confidentiality aspects of the Revised Policy are not adhered
to, the Unions have more explicit areas of complaint without the

-7burden of presumptions created by the Company's exercise of less
-defined powers under Rules 18 and 19 above.
A closer look at the revised Policy, juxtaposed with Rules
18 and 19 is in order.

The Revised Policy (Company Exhibit #15)

is incorporated by reference herein, and attached hereto and made
a part hereof.
The "PHILOSOPHY STATEMENT" (page 1) is not inconsistent with
Rules 18 and 19.

I believe that the basic reasons for Rules 18

and 19 are now articulated in that "STATEMENT."
"NEED" (on page 2 and page 3) is consistent with my findings on the "propriety" of a Policy, and as modified by later
reference in this Decision is not a working condition departure
from Rules 18 and 19.
Page 4 entitled "PURPOSE" differs from Rules 18 and 19 only
in the respect and by the fact that it provides for the use of
supervisory employees as a method in detecting drug and alcohol
use; reiterates the Company's right to discipline and discharge
for offenses; sets up a counseling program and accords re-employment rights under certain specific conditions (including "testing at frequent intervals") for employees previously discharged
for substance abuse.
I am satisfied that the Company has had the managerial
right to use supervisory employees as a method to detect drug
and alcohol use and therefore this specific provision is only a
"fleshing out" of what had been an implicit power.

That disci-

pline, including discharge may be imposed for violation of the
Policy is no different from the disciplinary penalties, including discharge set forth in Rules 18 and 19.
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The establishment of a counseling service is something not
provided under Rules 18 and 19.

But clearly, if administered

professionally and confidentially, it represents a benefit to
the affected employee and not an added burden, restriction or
unreasonable condition of employment.

The addition of what is

intended as a therapeutic benefit, if administered properly, can
hardly be construed as the kind of major variation from Rules 18
and 19 that requires bi-lateral bargaining.
The same is true regarding the conditions imposed on an
employee re-hired after being discharged for drug or alcohol
abuse.

Rules 18 and 19 do not accord the benefit of re-employ-

ment.

This is a new provision that is both beneficial to an em-

ployee previously and properly discharged, and inasmuch as it is
consistent with an employer's unquestioned right under the Act
to hire and select new employees, may be enacted without dealing
with the bargaining agent.
In sum, I find nothing in the "PURPOSE" section of the
Policy which is at such variance from the explicit and implicit
provisions of Rules 18 and 19 or which set forth new conditions
that meet the definition of "conditions of employment" within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Sections A and C of the "DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE"
(on page 5) are simply reiterations of certain parts of Rules 18
and 19.

Section B can be construed to expand Rules 18 and 19 by

regulating "off duty" and "off-premises" use of drugs and alcohol,
However, I view it as

a logical and understandable extension of

the Company's right under Rule 19 to prohibit "being on Company
premises under the influence..."

Section B does not prohibit
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off duty or off premises use of alcohol or drugs but rather their
use when it "interferes with the individual's performance or
social adjustment at work."

Assuming the reasonableness of that

concern, and the reasonableness and uniformity of its application,
I conclude that the use of drugs and alcohol off-premises that
impair an employee's job effectiveness and/or employment relationships is a matter about which an employer may promulgate a work
rule without bargaining with the Union.

Especially so, where,

as here, the rule is a logical and reasonable extension of an
existing, unilaterally promulgated work rule.
Section A of the DEFINITION OF UNDER THE INFLUENCE (on
page 6) is not in dispute.
Section B, with its footnote 2 is very much in dispute.

As

set forth later, I have made modifications in Section B to accord
with my views on due process and to accord with the evidence in
this proceeding.

With those modifications, I am satisfied that

this part of the policy does not require bilateral bargaining.
Also, procedurally,

Section B is a definition, albeit a disputed

definition, of that part of the existing Rule 19 that refers to
"being...under the influence..."

As The Company unilaterally

promulgated Rule 19 prohibiting "being under the influence" I see
no legal impediment to its unilateral promulgation of a rule or
policy defining "being under the influence."

What remains how-

ever, is whether the definition is "reasonable" and its implementation "reasonable," both of which are requirements for an enforceable work rule.

That question is dealt with later.

But the bare

inclusion of a definition of "under the influence" in the Policy
does not require bilateral bargaining.
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The PRIOR TO HIRING procedures of Section A of HIRING
AND RECALL PROCEDURES (on page 7) concern matters that are
managerial prerogatives under the Act and not subject to mandatory bargaining.

The PROCEDURES a, b, c, and d, regarding hir-

ing or considering the re-application of an applicant are further
implementations of the Company's managerial rights in the hiring
process.

As such, and again without dealing at this point with

the reasonableness of those procedures, particularly procedure
c which extends testing into and during the first year of employment for a re-applicant who was found to be a drug or alcohol
user when originally rejected for employment, I find them to be
sufficiently related to the Company's unrestricted right to hire
without bargaining with the Unions, to be immune from the requirements of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Section B RECALLS FROM LAYOFF (on page 7), is a methodological implementation of Rule 19 and hence immune from the
bargaining requirements of Section 8 (a)(5) of the Act.
DETECTION AND ENFOREMENT Procedures (on page 8), are express repeats of the existing Rules 18 and 19 and a reiteration
of existing rules relating to alcohol and substance abuse.

As

such they only repeat what the Company did previously and unilaterally, and do not require bilateral bargaining under the Act.
Section A, REASONABLE BASIS FOR TESTING (on page 8) , is
an explicit methodological implementation of the Company's implicit right under Rules 18 and 19 to discover violations thereof and more specific implementation of that part of Rule 19 which
accords the Company the right to require tests conducted by the
Medical Department.

Subject to the "reasonableness test" which
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ls determined later herein, and considering the modifications I
have ordered in the procedures of Section A, I do not find that
this Section requires bilateral bargaining for its effectuation.
The same applies to the PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS, examples and
procedures (on page 9) and is also covered by my holdings set
forth earlier under the PURPOSE section of the Policy.
Subject to the test of "reasonableness" and the requirement of reasonableness and uniformity in its application, I find
that the remaining provisions of the Revised Policy, namely those
under the headings of ACCIDENTS OR INJURY, INDUSTRIAL HEALTH EXAMINATION, VISIBLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE, WITNESSED USE, DISCIPLINE,
INSPECTION OF PROPERTY, CONVICTION OF CRIME, and ADMINISTRATION
OF POLICY, are all procedures, methods and implementations of
the substantive provisions of Rules 18 and 19, consistent with
the Company's implied managerial rights related thereto.
Again, as Rules 18 and 19 were validly promulgated by the
Company on a unilateral basis, those more precise, delineated
methods and procedures for the administration and enforcement of
the Rules are not significant variations from those Rules nor
are they new conditions of employment requiring bilateral bargaining under the Act.
The Unions argue that because the Company bargained on rules
regarding an absentee program, work rules on drug and alcohol
abuse become matters for mandatory bargaining as well. I find
no persuasive authority for this concept.

By bargaining with the

Unions on an absentee program, the Company brought that subject
matter into the arena of bilateral bargaining.

But separate

subject matters stand separately, and the Company must do the
same with the subject of drug and alcohol abuse in order to
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transform its unilateral rule making authority over that subject
under Article III of the contracts into a subject that must be
bilaterally bargained.

The Company has not done so.

Accordingly, reserving the questions of "reasonableness"
and recognizing that certain modifications in the Policy are
made by this Decision, I do not find that the Company committed
and unfair labor practice or violated the National Labor Relations Act by its unilateral promulgation and implementation of
its SUBSTANCE ABUSE POLICY AND PROCEDURES

(Revised).

Additionally, and largely for the same reasons I find that
the unilateral promulgation and implementation of the Policy did
not violate the collective bargaining agreement.
The Management Functions clauses in both Union contracts
(Article III) expressly "require employees to observe the BIWs
rules and regulations."

Impliedly, a requirement that Company

rules and regulations be observed, authorizes the Company to
legislate those rules and regulations.

I do not find that this

traditional management function is limited by any express provisions of the contract, nor, in the case of Article III in the
Local 6 contract, does the proper promulgation of

rules and

regulations by the Company represent an "exercise...(of a)
management functions in a manner which violates its obligations
under this Agreement."

As Rules 18 and 19 were consistent with

management rights under Article III of both contracts, the unilateral, methodological, implementation of those rules under the
Revised Policy is neither violative of the contract nor management's obligations thereunder.
Reasonableness
It is universally well settled that to be enforceable, rules
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and regulations unilaterally promulgated and implemented by management must be job related, reasonable as to terms and conditions
well disseminated

or published, and consistently and uniformly

applied to all employees similarly situated.
I have previously held that the Revised Policy is adequately job related.

There is no dispute over its publication and/or

dissemination to the work force.

The consistency and uniformity

of application are matters for future observations and determinations on a case-by-case basis.

What is to be decided herein is

whether the Policy in whole or in part

is or is not a reasonable

response and a reasonable set of requirements to meet what I have
held to be a proper purpose.
The EMIT Test and The
GC/MS Confirming Test
The Unions have offered considerable testimony, evidence
and argument designed to show that the EMIT test, even with GC/
MS confirmation can, in a certain percentage of cases, produce
results that are inaccurate, misleading or wrong.

I accept this

proposition that these types of tests are not fully accurate and
that errors can and will be made.

But my authority in this case

is to decide whether the Policy and Procedures, which include
these testing procedures is reasonable enough for Company-wide
implementation.

I do not conclude that the probability of some

errors is enough to void these tests as part of the Policy and
Procedures.

Indeed, a percentage of error is probable for any

type of test utilized.

I am satisfied that the EMIT test, with

confirmation by GC/MS are sufficiently accurate and reliable to
warrant sustaining their reasonableness as a general part of the
Policy and Procedures.

V7hether or not the EMIT Test and the GC/

MS confirmation is accurate for a particular affected employee
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and whether there are other acceptable explanations for any
positive findings in any particular case are matters which may
be contested and adjudicated on a case-by-case basis as individual
cases arise from the implementation of the Policy and Procedure.
In other words, I am not prepared to void the EMIT test and/or
the GC/MS confirmation test as generally unreasonable in deciding the propriety of the Revised Policy and Procedure, but I
expressly reserve the rights of any affected employee and the
Unions on his behalf to contest the particular validity and accuracy of those tests in any particular situation in which that
employee may be involved.

I hold that the accuracy of the EMIT

test and/or the results of the GC/MS confirmation test are matters which may be adjudicated as part of a grievance or an arbitration protesting the Company's action against an employee who
tests positive.
I find that the Revised Policy and Procedure meets the
test of reasonableness except as follows:
I.

The quotations following "bullets" (on page 2) under

NEED, are not fully supported by facts or probative evidence in
the record.

As they presently stand they are editorial in nature,

subjective and debatable.

They are quotations from a subjective

and probably partisan report and though possibly consistent with
general propositions, have not been proved to be statistically
accurate or broadly accepted by recognized authorities.
Most significant is the fact that these statements are
unnecessarily patronizing and provocative to a bilateral employment relationship, and unnecessary surplusage for the effectiveness and utilization of the Policy.
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Accordingly I direct that the four quotated statements
set off by the "bullets" under the heading NEED (on page 2)
be deleted from the Policy.
II.

I find Section B of Article V and footnote 2 (on

page 6) and the standard adapted by the Company thereunder as
constituting "under the influence of an illegal drug" to fall
short of meeting the test of reasonableness.
Under this provision, an employee whose urine discloses
the presence of 100 rig of Delta 9-THC acid metabolites following an EMIT test is presumptively "under the influence" of
marijuana, and is deemed conclusively "under the influence" if
the presence of Delta 9-THC is confirmed by the laboratory GC/MS
test.

The Company uses the 100 ng threshold level for the EMIT

test, as footnote 2 states, to "eliminate questionable test results based on minute or trace amounts of illegal drugs..." and
"to eliminate the possibility that a positive test might result
only from indirect drug use (e.g. smoke filled room, car pools,
etc.)."

I have no quarrel with the use of a threshold quantity

for referral of the EMIT test for laboratory confirmation and
I have no quarrel with the 100 nig threshold level.

My quarrel

is with the Company's conclusion that a level of 100 rig in the
urine in the EMIT test, if confirmed by the laboratory GC/MS
test, means that the employee is "under the influence."
The expert testimony and evidence in this record is extensive and scholarly.
setting.

But it is sharply conflicting and off

From the evidence I cannot conclude that a level of

100 ng of Delta 9-THC acid in the urine, if confirmed, produces
impairment, mental or physical changes or other symptoms associated with being under the influence.

In short, in this case as

-16in others I have heard involving the same question, the experts
are in wide disagreement over what quantity of marijuana produces impairment, how quickly, and for what period of time.

The

evidence in this case does not conclusively show that a record] ing of 100 ng in the urine, if confirmed, is synonymous with any
mental or physical impairment.

Unfortunately medical and pharma-

cological experts have not been able to establish the quantity of
marijuana in the urine, the blood, or the system generally, that
produces impairment or constitites "under the influence" as they
have been able to do with alcohol. I deem "impairment" and "under
the influence" to be synonymous.
If the Policy is left to stand unmodified in this regard,
employees with confirmed positive tests at or above the 100 ng
level will be absolutely determined to be "impaired" or "under
the influence" regardless of their objective mental and physical
conditions, and stigmatized with the "under the influence" diagnosis, when the medical evidence remains equivocal and disputed.
I think this is arbitrary and unfair in a most sensitive and
critical area.

This is not to say that use of marijuana does

not impair the faculties.

I am convinced it does.

Rather it is

to say that the experts disagree on the quantity required for
impairment or for being "under the influence" and for how long
impairment lasts from any given quantity.
On the other hand, for the Company to have an effective
policy, as it is entitled to have, some unacceptable or prohibited level of marijuana or other drugs must and may be fixed.
While I consider it unreasonable for the Company to deem 100 ng
synonymous with impairment or being under the influence of marijuana, with the social stigma that attaches to any such finding,
I do not consider it unreasonable for the Company to deem an EMIT
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test of 100 ng of Delta 9-THC acid, if confirmed, to be a prohibited or an unacceptable level of the drug, and to conclude
that such a level may cause impairment or may result in being
under the influence.
Therefore Section B, and the wording of the title of
Article V (on page 6) shall be changed to reflect the foregoing.
Section B shall read:
A prohibited amount of an illegal drug which
may cause impairment or may result in being
under the influence means the presence of
any detectable amount of an illegal drug in
an employee.
The title of paragraph 1 Section B DISCIPLINE

(on page 11)

shall be changed from "Under the Influence" to "Under the Influence of Alcohol or Prohibited Levels of Drugs."
The body of the first sentence of paragraph 1 shall be
changed to read:
"Any employee who is under the influence of
alcohol or who, by tests, has a prohibited
level of drugs in his system shall be suspended for a minimum of five (5) days.
Footnote 3 (on page 11) shall be modified accordingly as well.
The balance of paragraph 1 and all of paragraph 2 shall remain
as presently written.
Footnote 2 (on page 6) may remain as presently worded, but
in implementing the EMIT test and the GC/MS confirming test the
100 ng level shall not be deemed as constituting impairment or
"being under the influence," but rather a "prohibited level because it may cause impairment or may result in being under the
influence."
The title or heading of Article V (on page 6) which now
reads:
DEFINITION OF UNDER THE INFLUENCE
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shall be changed to read:
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND PROHIBITED LEVELS OF DRUGS
III. The phrase "reasonable basis" found in Section B of
Article VI, in Section A of Article VII, in paragraphs 1, 2 and
3 of Section A of Article VIII, and wherever else used in the
Policy, and the phrase "reason to believe" found in paragraphs
4 and 5 of Section A, Article VII and wherever else used in the
Policy, shall be deemed synonymous as to meaning with the phrase
"probable cause."

The "belief" that an employee is "under the

influence" or "visibly under the influence" may remain but the
reference in paragraph 4 to a confirmation of the belief by testing is subject to the aforesaid "prohibited level" characterization.
IV.

The potential seriousness of the consequences of

urine testing for drugs requires in my judgment, some additional
due process protection within the procedures of Section A of
Article VII (on page 8) entitled REASONABLE BASIS FOR TESTING.
Included therein shall be the provision that when an employee's
urine is taken and initially tested for drugs or alcohol, a
Company physician shall be present and supervise the process.
This shall apply to times when a Company physician is on duty.
If a physician is not on duty, and if practicable without prejudice to the validity of the specimen, the urine testing should
await the regular arrival of a Company physician.

Only if that

is not practicable because of prejudice to the validity of the
urine specimen shall a non-physician employee of the Industrial
Health Department undertake the testing.
Additionally, in accordance with the foregoing conditions,
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and again because of the serious consequences from a positive
test, the Company physician shall also examine the affected employee physically for the presence or lack of presence of other
symptoms of drug and alcohol use.
should include a test of

By example, that examination

reflexes, examinations of eyes, gait,

general demeanor, breath and condition of speech.

If the urine

EMIT test is positive and is referred for laboratory confirmation,
the results of the rest of the aforesaid physical examination
shall be included by the physician and the Industrial Health
Department in a report to the Company and shall be made a part
of the official record of any disciplinary action imposed on and/
or counseling required of the affected employee and shall be
available if the matter is grieved or arbitrated.
Also, if the affected employee makes the request, part of
the sample of his urine taken by the Company shall be given to
him.

How and in what manner, if any, that sample may be used by

him or the Union remains a matter for judgment and determination
on a case-by-case basis in the implementation of the Revised
Policy.
The Employee Assistance Counselor and Program
I am satisfied that the Company has good and positive intentions in referring employees with alcohol and drug problems
to the Employee Assistance Counselor.

Similarly, I am satisfied

that the Counselor(s) intend to be helpful and that their objective and the objective of the plan or program is rehabilitative
and therapeutic.

These good intentions and any good work emanat-

ing from the referral program will be thoroughly dissipated if
essential confidentiality is not maintained and safeguarded.
The Policy's statement in Section E of Article VII (on
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page 13) is critical to the administration of the entire Revised
Substance Abuse Policy and Procedures.

The statement is worth

repeating and emphasizing in this Decision.

It says:

"BIW is committed to implementing this
policy in a fair and equitable manner
which respects the dignity and privacy
of the individual."
The Company's failure to do so would not only subvert the purpose
and objective of the Policy, but would constitute a grievable and
arbitrable breach of the Policy.
Arbitrability
With this Decision and with the foregoing interpretations
and modifications, the Revised Substance Abuse Policy and Procedures as a policy and procedure is no longer subject to arbitration.

What remains grievable and arbitrable are allegations by

the Unions of non-compliance with the Policy and Procedures in
case-by-case implementation thereof.

For example, grievable and

arbitrable would be claims that the facts make the Policy inapplicable; that Company actions were not based on "probable
cause" or "reasonable basis"; that testing was not carried out as
prescribed; that there were fatal irregularities in the "chain
of custody" of the urine; that the test results or the scientific
methodology of the tests were faulty as to the employee involved;
that the Policy and Procedures were not uniformly and consistently applied to all employees similarly situated; that a Company
physician did not play the role I have

prescribed; that safe-

guards to protect confidentiality were not followed.

These are

only examples and are not all inclusive of case-by-case grievable
and arbitrable disputes arising out of the application of the
Revised Policy.

-21-

In this regard, I take the liberty of making a recommendation.

I strongly recommend that the parties establish an umpire-

ship or impartial chairmanship for the adjudication of disputes
arising out of the Policy.

I would recommend that because of

the obvious sensitive nature of certain aspects of the Policy and
Procedures the umpire or impartial chairman selected by the
parties be available to hear and decide the cases on short notice.
It would appear preferable that the parties select such an arbitrator who is located in close proximity to the Company's facilities or who is able to travel to those facilities quickly and
on short notice.

If disputes can be resolved quickly (perhaps

with the hearing scheduled within 24 hours after the dispute arises and a decision within 24 hours after a hearing), confidence
in the need, fairness and due process of the Policy and Procedures will be enhanced.

And the entire process should develop in-

to a mutual endeavor by the Company and the Unions in this industrial setting to deal with or protect against one of the most
devasting problems facing contemporary

society.

Retention of Jurisdiction
To handle any unanswered question arising out of the instant case and for the resolution of questions over the interpretation and application of this Decision, I shall retain
jurisdiction.
AWARD
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties makes the following AWARD:
With the modifications and interpretations
set forth above the Company has the right
to implement its Substance Abuse Policy
(Revised).

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: June 30, 1986
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

July 7, 1986

Patrick N. McTeague, Esq.
McTeague, Higbee, Libner, Reitman
MacAdam & Case
169 Park Row
P. 0. Box 340
Brunswick, Maine 04011
Duane D. Fitzgerald, Esq.
Fitzgerald, Conley & Haley
746 High Street
Bath, Maine 04530
RE: Locals 6 and 7 IUMSWA -andBath Iron Works
Gentlemen:
In my Opinion in the above matter, the word "undefined" at the beginning of the second sentence on page 7
should be "defined."
Also, the word "probably" in the sixth line from
the bottom on page 13 should be "probable."
I regret these errors.
Very truly yours,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
EJS:hl

April 28, 1986

BATH IRON WORKS CORPORATION SUBSTANCE ABUSE POLICY AND PROCEDURES
(Revised)
I.

PHILOSOPHY STATEMENT

All members of the shipyard community will contribute more
effectively when free of substance abuse.
BIW believes its people are the most vital asset and key
ingredient in a prosperous company. BIW acknowledges that some
individuals may become victims of chemical dependency or abuse. As
appropriate, they should be given the opportunity to restore
themselves to a healthy condition and continued employment. The
Company is convinced that a substance abuse free work environment
is essential to a safe and productive shipyard.
Management, commitment, education, effective communication,
respect for confidentiality, definition of responsibilities,
consistently applied guidelines and discipline are all essential to
a substance abuse free environment. Proper application of all of
these actions helps lead the drug/alcohol abuser to treatment,
improves the safety of the workplace, and helps to assure higher
quality and increased productivity.
The combined approach of supportive counseling through the BIW
Employee Assistance Program and adherence to the procedures and
disciplines outlined in this policy are necessary to eliminate
substance abuse from the workplace. This philosophy is the
foundation on which a substance abuse policy shall be implemented,
maintained and administered. It supports fair and consistent
administration of rehabilitative services and disciplinary action
necessary to assure a safe and productive environment for all BIW
employees. This policy is intended to apply to all employees
regardless of position.

EXHIBIT
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II.

NEED

The workforce at Bath Iron Works is similar to most heavy
industrial corporations, where drug and alcohol abuse have trecome
major problems. These problems affect security, safety, quality
control, productivity and employee health. Current professional
thinking on drug abuse (alcohol is considered to be a drug)
supports the following:
"Drug users are almost four times as likely as non-users
to be involved in a plant accident... and are five times
more likely to file a workers' compensation claim than
non-users."
'"...drug abusers work at two-thirds of their potential.
And they miss work more often...drug abusers received
three times the average level of sick benefits and were
2.5 times as likely to be absent from work for more than a
week than employees who didn't use drugs."
"A progressive approach to the problem calls for business
to accept the reality of drug abuse; accept the limitations inherent in government policing of drug use; look
upon prevention and treatment of the problem.... and view
the workplace as one of the most important places to begin
turning the tide."
"Detection at work, with the threat of job loss, is
probably the most effective motivation for a chronic drug
abuser to seek help."
BIW has concluded that it must take positive action on its own
to combat a serious threat to everyone. The workplace has been
shown to be the setting where most effective action can take place.
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BIW's responsibilities and legal obligations to the general
public, its employees, contractors, the Department of the Navy and
its other customers mandate the policy.

- 4 -

III.

PURPOSE

It is the intention of this policy to eliminate substance abuse
and its effects at Bath Iron Works. While the Company has no
intention of intruding into the private lives of its employees,
involvement with drugs and alcohol off the job can take its toll on
job performance and employee safety. Our concern is that employees
are in a condition to perform their duties safely and efficiently,
in the interests of their fellow workers as well as themselves.
The presence of drugs and alcohol on the job, and the influence of
these substances on employees during working hours are inconsistent
with this objective.
Employees who think they may have a problem are strongly urged
to voluntarily seek confidential assistance through the Employee
Assistance Counselor, extension 3479. BIW is committed to assist
employees in a supportive way and without the fear of reprisal if
they voluntarily request help. While BIW will be supportive of
those who seek help voluntarily, the Company will be equally firm
in identifying and disciplining those who continue to be substance
abusers and do not seek help.
Supervisors will be trained to recognize abusers and become
involved in this control process. EAP Helpers will help with
difficult cases. Alcohol or drug abuse will not be tolerated at
BIW, and disciplinary action, up to and including termination, will
be used as necessary to achieve this goal.
If an individual is discharged for violating this policy,
rehabilitation will be a factor considered if re-employment is
possible at a later date. As a condition of any such re-employment, the returning employee must agree that for a period of one
year BIW will have the right to a test at frequent intervals for
the presence of alcohol and illegal drugs.

Any such reinstated

employee will be immediately discharged if testing is positive.
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IV.

DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE

Substance abuse at Bath Iron Works is defined as follows
A.

Use or possession of alcohol or illegal drugs

on

company premises, including parking areas.
B.

Use of alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs while off
company premises which interferes with the individual's
performance or social adjustment at work.

C.

Being under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol
while on Company premises.

"illegal Drug" means: any drug (a) which is not legally
obtainable or (bj which is legally obtainable' but nas not been
legally obtained. The term includes prescribed drugs not legally
obtained and prescribed drugs not being used for prescribed
purposes. It also includes marijuana.

- 6 -

V.
A.

DEFINITION OF UNDER THE INFLUENCE

BIW's standard of measurement for evidence of being under
the influence of alcohol will be the same as the Maine
statutes for operating a motor vehicle under the influence
of alcohol which means that blood alcohol in excess of
0.1% is defined as being under the influence. Moreover,
blood alcohol in excess of 0.05% and less than 0.1% will
be considered together with perform- ance and/or behavior
in deciding whether an employee is under the influence.

B.

Under the influence of an illegal drug means the presence
of any detectable amount of any illegal drug in an
2
employee.—

Tests conducted by BIW for illegal drugs establish threshold
levels tor positive readings that are sufficiently'high to
eliminate questionable test results based on minute or trace
amounts of illegal drugs. This threshold level greatly increases
the reliability of test results and eliminates the possibility that
a positive test might result only from indirect drug use (e.g.,
smoke filled rooms, car pools, etc.).
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VI.
A.

HIRING AND RECALL PROCEDURES

PRIOR TO HIRING:
A pre-employment physical will be given to all applicants

being considered for employment.

Included in the physical will be

a test for the presence of illegal drugs. (The company also
reserves the right to administer testing for the presence of
alcohol in the blood during the pre-employment physical.) If the
test proves positive, the following procedures will apply:
PROCEDURES:
a.

The applicant will be refused employment.

b.

The applicant may not re-apply for at least 90 days.

c.

If such an applicant is subsequently hired, BIW
reserves the right, at any time during the first year
of employment, to periodically test that individual
for the presence of illegal drugs or levels of
alcohol.

d.

If testing proves positive, that employee will be
immediately discharged.

B.

RECALLS FROM LAYOFF
When an employee with recall rights is being recalled from

layoff, a test for the presence of illegal drugs and/or alcohol may
be required if there is a reasonable basis for a test. If the test
is positive, the recalled employee will be subject to discipline as
described in Section VII(B).
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DETECTION AND ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES

Bath Iron Works Corporation Rules and Regulations which
directly relate to substance abuse are:
RULE //18 - Use, possession, distribution, sale, or offering for
sale, of narcotics, or dangerous drugs including marijuana, or
alcoholic beverages on Company premises at any time.
consequence for violating this rule is:
Discharge.

The

RULE //19 - Being on Company premises under the influence of
alcohol, narcotics, or dangerous drugs including marijuana, or
refusing to submit to a test administered by the Industrial Health
Department to determine if under such influence.
The consequence for violating this rule is:

First offense, 5

days off; Second offense, discharge.
There are other rules which deal with the effects of substance
abuse on performance. Those rules will apply as required.

A.

REASONABLE BASIS FOR TESTING

Testing is the most valid objective method for determining
the presence of alcohol or illegal drugs in the body. Therefore,
testing will be an important tool in achieving our goal. BIV may
require urinalysis or other drug/alcohol screening of those
employees suspected of using or being under the influence of an
illegal drug or alcohol. Supervising personnel will be trained to
recognize and intervene where employees appear to be using or under
the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol. The Industrial Health
Department shall test for drugs and alcohol when employees are
referred. If an employee refuses to submit to a test for alcohol
content and/or illegal drugs, such action will be treated as if the
testing occurred and was positive.

.

7
- 9 Listed below are illustrative examples of situations where
referral for testing may be appropriate; they are not intended to
be all inclusive:
1.

PERFORMANCE

PROBLEMS

Deterioration of work performance and absenteeism are
indications that an employee may be abusing alcohol or illegal
drugs.

This may be a reasonable basis to justify the following

procedures:
If performance deteriorates or if absenteeism becomes
a problem, corrective action will include the following:
a.

A supervisor will talk with the employee about
his/her performance.
This meeting may be
led by an EAP Helper and may be attended by
a designated union representative.

If substance

abuse appears
to be a factor in the employee's
L-i
i.
4
performance, the employee will be urged to seek
assistance from the Employee Assistance
Counselor or other professional programs.
b.

If performance continues at an unacceptable
level, and there is a reasonable basis to

>.

believe that substance abuse is a factor, the
supervisor in consultation with Human Resources
will refer the employee for testing.

s

2.

ACCIDENTS OR INJURIES
When an employee is involved in a work related

accident or lost time injury a medical evaluation will be made.
The Industrial Health Department in consultation with Human
Resources may administer tests if there is a reasonable basis to
believe that substance abuse is a factor.
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3.

INDUSTRIAL HEALTH EXAMINATION
When an employee receives treatment in the Industrial

Health Clinic and a qualified medical professional has a reasonable
basis to believe substance abuse is a factor, the employee will be

tes ted.
4.

VISIBLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE:
If a security guard, supervisor, medical

professional, or another employee detects physical symptoms such as
staggering, alcohol on breath, slurred speech, etc., that employee
will be referred to Industrial Health and will be required to take
a test.
When a security guard, supervisor or company official has
reason to believe an employee is under the influence on company
premises, he will escort the employee to Industrial Health for
testing and notify his/her supervisor.

5.

WITNESSED USE
Any employee who is witnessed by a supervisor,

security guard or other company official us ing alcohol or illegal
drugs on company premises will be subject to discharge under Rule
18.
Credible reports of employee use of illegal drugs or
alcohol and credible reported observations where there is reason to
believe there has been a violation of Company policy shall
constitute a reasonable basis to test.
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DISCIPLINE
1.

Under the Influence

Any employee who is under the influence of alcohol or
illegal drugs shall be suspended for a minimum of five (5)
days. The employee will continue on suspension until a
subsequent
_
_test discloses .no presence
_ . of alcohol in
amounts described earlier or illegal drugs.
The
employee will also be referred to EAP. Upon return to
work, the employee will be subject to periodic testing for
one year. A second positive test during this period will
result in discharge.
2.

Possession

Alcohol or illegal drugs, including drug
paraphernalia as defined by Maine State law (17-A M.R.S.A.
§1111-A) are prohibited on company property. If an
employee is found having such substances or paraphernalia
in his/her possession, the following procedures will apply:

In the event subsequent tests prior to reinstatement disclose
thatthe employee is under the influence of another drug or
alcohol, the employee will be subject to discharge.
J

If the suspension results from a positive test for marijuana,
and if a subsequent test indicates the continued presence of
marijuana, and if there is no reasonablebasis to believe that the
marijuana was taken after the suspension period began, it will be
assumed that the marijuana is the same as was detected in the
original test, and therefore, the employee will remain on
suspension for a maximum of thirty (30) calendar days, but will not
be subject to discharge. If_the test results are positive beyond
thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the original test the
employee will be subject to discharge.
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Procedures:
a.

Supervisors will document the incident, notify
the Security Department, and escort the employee
out of the shipyard.

b.

C.

The employee will be disciplined under Rule 18.

INSPECTION OF PROPERTY
BIW reserves the right to inspect any company or personal

property on the premises, including but not limited to briefcases,
tool boxes, lockers, office furniture, etc.

The following

procedures will apply:
Procedures:
a.

If practical, the employee will be present and the
employee's supervisor will contact and have present
the department head, security guard and if
appropriate a shop steward when searching an
employee's briefcase, locker, desk, tool box, or
other office furniture.

b.

If the employee is not present, a list of items found
will be made and witnessed by three of the
individuals present.

c.

If alcohol or illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia are
found, that employee will be questioned and may be
suspended from work, and subject to discharge pending
completion of the investigation.
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D.

CONVICTED OF CRIME

If an employee of BIW is convicted of a drug related crime
(other than use) under Maine State law [Title 17-A M . R . S . A .
Sections 1101-1116 (sale, t h e f t , e t c , of d r u g s ) ] or similar crimes
in other j u r i s d i c t i o n s , the employee will be discharged. An
employee who is convicted of a crime for use of illegal drugs or
alcohol related crimes will be subjected to periodic testing for
one year following the date of conviction.

The employee may be

subject to discipline, based upon a consideration of the facts and
circumstances involved, including the e f f e c t of the event and
conviction on the conduct of company b u s i n e s s .

E.

ADMINISTRATION OF POLICY
BIW is committed 'to implementing this policy in a fair and

equitable manner which respects the dignity and privacy of the
individual.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
East Meadow Teachers Association
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1739-0070- 86

Board of Education, East Meadow
Union Free School District

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate Articles 8.10 and
21.3 of the collective bargaining agreement
when it failed to approve graduate courses
taken by the grievants; Germain Fontaine,
Anton Gary, Renee Telsey and Maxine Wachter,
for the purpose of lateral movement on the
salary schedule? If so, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on December 3, 1986 at the offices of
the School District at which time representatives of the abovenamed Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Article 8.10 reads:
Effective September 1, 1984, abbreviated weekend courses must have the prior approval of
the Superintendent of Schools in order to be
accepted for movement on the salary schedule.
Article 21.3 reads:
This agreement may not be changed orally and
may only be changed in writing and signed by
both parties.
The courses taken by the grievants were not approved by
the Superintendent of Schools because the Employer deemed them
to be "abbreviated weekend courses" within the meaning of
Article 8.10 of the contract.

As a result, the grievants did

not get credit for those courses for the purpose of lateral
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movement on the salary schedule.
The issue is narrow.

It is simply whether the courses

involved were "abbreviated weekend courses" within the meaning
and proscription of Article 8.10.
The Employer contends that the phrase "abbreviated weekend courses" is generic and was intended to mean courses of
questionable pedogogical value; those with little academic demands; and completed over a short period of time, whether on
"weekends" or at other times.
In his testimony, the Assistant Superintendent of Schools
for Personnel defined "abbreviated weekend courses" as "cockamamie courses;" or courses which lacked accreditation (such as
AZUZU courses).

In summation, the Employer characterised "abbre-

viated weekend courses" as like those which were "museum tours"
and like RITA courses for which an applicant got "20 warm
fuzzies" upon enrollment.
The parties offered considerable testimony on the negotiation history of the contract phrase "abbreviated weekend
courses."

The Union asserts that the proscription is limited

to the contract language, namely to courses "taken on weekends"
and of a duration less than required by the offering institution
for credit.

The Union claims that the Employer wished to fore-

close "weekend museum bus tours."
The evidence on what the parties intended when the contract language was negotiated is conflicting, offsetting and
inconclusive.

In that circumstance the Arbitrator is left to

the base contract

language.

The instant courses were not taken on weekends.
express contract restriction is not applicable.

So that

The parties
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stipulated that Article 8.10 does not require that courses enjoy certification or accreditation, so argument over whether
the courses involved would be approved by the State Department
of Education is immaterial.
Hence it would appear that a RITA course would not be
ineligible.

None of the courses were under the AZUZU program.

The other contract word is "abbreviated."

If that word is

conjunctive with "weekends," the fact that the courses were not
taken on weekends makes their time span also immaterial.

If

"abbreviated" is separated from "weekends," I am not persuaded
that the instant courses in fact, were "abbreviated."

It is

true that the courses were completed within the short span of
time of a week or so.
Fridays.

But they met for full days Mondays through

Those for which two graduate credits were obtained re-

quired 20 hours of classroom work; and those for three credits
required 35 hours of classroom work and, in some instances, 11
additional hours of non-classroom work.

These required hours

of attendance and work accord with what is usually required for
courses with those credits, and in terms of the quantity of
hours of classroom attendance and non-classroom
cannot be deemed "abbreviated."
ments may

assignments,

In short, the course require-

have been "concentrated" within a short chronological

period, but were not "abbreviated."
Significant to my mind is the fact that the instant
courses were all offered for credit by reputable and accredited
institutions of higher education; the University of Bridgeport,
Central Connecticut State University and Pottsdam College.
those auspices, I cannot find that they were "cockamamie" or
of the "museum tour" type to which the Employer refers.

Under
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Bound as I am to the contract language negotiated by the
parties, I do not find that the instant courses were "abbreviated
weekend courses" within the language or meaning of Article 8.10
of the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Employer violated Article 8.10 of
the collective bargaining agreement when
it failed to approve graduate courses taken
by the grievants; Germaine Fontaine, Anton
Gary, Renee Telsey and Maxine Wachter. They
shall be accorded credit for those courses
for purposes of lateral movement on the salary
schedule.
Article 21.3 is irrelevant.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 29, 1986
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York)83':
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Clove Lakes Nursing Home & Health
Related Facility
and

N

AWARD

Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing
Home & Allied Services Union, SEIU
AFL-CIO

In accordance with Articles J and K of the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named Employer and Union,
the Employer originally claimed before the Undersigned Reimbursement Review Panel that it is unaffordable to meet the wage increases under said contract for the years 1984 and 1985.
However, during the course of the hearings, following
presentation of its economic case for the year 1984 and following |
the Union's rebuttal of that case, the Employer conceded that it
was affordable to pay the contract wage increase for 1984 in 1984.
It agreed to make those payments pursuant to the contract and
withdrew its petition herein for relief from the 1984 wage increase in the year 1984.
That left in dispute the affordability of the Employer for
the 1984 wage increase in the year 1985 and for the 1985 contractual wage increase.
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the
Employer is affordable to the extent of, and has available for
payment of the 1984 increase in 1985 and the 1985 wage increase,
the total sum of $423,500 (four hundred and twenty three thousand
and five hundred dollars.)
The Employer and the Union are directed to meet forthwith
to work out how and to whom this money is to be paid and on what
schedule.

If the Employer and the Union fail to agree within
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ten days from the date of this AWARD, the matters shall be
referred back to this Panel for those determinations.

For

V

that purpose we retain jurisdiction.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Chairman

Herbert Rothman
Concurring
Dissenting

Frank McKinney
Concurring

c/

DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York
ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
ecuted this instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Herbert Rothman do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who ex
ecuted this instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York ) ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Frank McKinney do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that* I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Clove Lakes Nursing Home & Health
Related Facility
and

\D

Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing
Home & Allied Services Union, SEIU
AFL-CIO

In accordance with Articles J and K of the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named Employer and Union,
the Employer originally claimed before the Undersigned Reimbursement Review Panel that it is unaffordable to meet the wage increases under said contract for the years 1984 and 1985.
However, during the course of the hearings, following
presentation of its economic case for the year 1984 and following
the Union's rebuttal of that case, the Employer conceded that it
was affordable to pay the contract wage increase for 1984 in 1984.
It agreed to make those payments pursuant to the contract and
withdrew its petition herein for relief from the 1984 wage increase in the year 1984.
That left in dispute the affordability of the Employer for j
the 1984 wage increase in the year 1985 and for the 1985 contractual wage increase.
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the
Employer is affordable to the extent of, and has available for
payment of the 1984 increase in 1985 and the 1985 wage increase,
the total sum of $423,500 (four hundred and twenty three thousand
and five hundred dollars.)
The Employer and the Union are directed to meet forthwith
to work out how and to whom this money is to be paid and on what
schedule.

If the Employer and the Union fail to agree within
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ten days from the date of this AWARD, the matters shall be
referred back to this Panel for those determinations.

For

V

that purpose we retain jurisdi-ction.

Eric/o. Schmertz
Chairman

Herbert Rothman
Concurring
Dissenting

Frank McKinney
Concurring
DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York )Sao
_ _•
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described Jan. and, who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Herbert Rothman do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Frank McKinney do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator tha£ I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

I
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Clove Lakes Nursing Home & Health
Related Facility
and

AWARD

Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing
Home & Allied Services Union, SEIU
AFL-CIO

In accordance with Articles J and K of the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named Employer and Union,
the Employer originally claimed before the Undersigned Reimbursement Review Panel that it is unaffordable to meet the wage increases under said contract for the years 1984 and 1985.
However, during the course of the hearings, following
presentation of its economic case for the year 1984 and following
the Union's rebuttal of that case, the Employer conceded that it
was affordable to pay the contract wage increase for 1984 in 1984.
It agreed to make those payments pursuant to the contract and
withdrew its petition herein for relief from the 1984 wage increase in the year 1984.
That left in dispute the affordability of the Employer for
the 1984 wage increase in the year 1985 and for the 1985 contractual wage increase.
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the
Employer is affordable to the extent of, and has available for
payment of the 1984 increase in 1985 and the 1985 wage increase,
the total sum of $423,500 (four hundred and twenty three thousand
and five hundred dollars.)
The Employer and the Union are directed to meet forthwith
to work out how and to whom this money is to be paid and on what
schedule.

If the Employer and the Union fail to agree within
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ten days from the date of this AWARD, the matters shall be
referred back to this Panel for those determinations.

For

that purpose we retain jurisdiction.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Herbert Rothman
Concurring
Dissenting

Frank McKinney
Concurring
Dissenting
DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York )„_
.
oo • .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Herbert Rothman do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Frank McKinney do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Clove Lakes Nursing Home & Health
Related Facility

A W A R D

and
Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing
Home & Allied Services Union, SEIU
AFL-CIO

As part of our Award of June 1986, the above-named Employer
"conceded that it was affordable to pay the contract wage increase
for 1984 in 1984" (emphasis added.)
What, remained in dispute in the proceeding leading to the
June 1986 Award was "the affordability of the Employer for the
1984 wage increase in the year 1985 and for the 1985 contractual
wage increase" (emphasis added).
Based significantly on stipulated figures, a majority of
the Board of Arbitration found, in its June 1986 Award, that the
Employer "is affordable to the extent of, and has available for
payment of the 1984 increase in 1985 and the 1985 wage increase,
the total sum of $423,500 (emphasis added).
The entire arbitration case leading to the June 1986 Award
dealt with the Employer's affordability to pay the wage increases
called for under the collective bargaining agreement for the year
1984, and for the wage increase carried forward from 1984 into
1985 and the wage increase called for in 1985.
As such, the Panel was dealing with the question of funds
available to the Employer to pay employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement.
unit employees.

The employees so covered are bargaining

r\e concession

that the Employer was

affordable

to pay the

1984 wage increase in 1984 was a concession that it had the funds
to pay wage increases for employees covered by the contract namely those of the bargaining

unit.

It follows therefore that the finding of affordability for
the 1984 wage increase in 1985 and the 1985 wage increase, in the
amount of $423,500 was in the same context, e.g., an affordability
in that amount for the employees for whom the contract mandated
those wage increases.
And, again those employees are members of the bargaining
unit covered by that contract.
Nowhere in the record was there any evidence, or even discussion of whether the sum of $423,500 was enough to cover the
contract wage increases in dispute.

Hence a majority of the Board

referred the matter back to the parties to attempt to negotiate
how the available $423,500 would be allocated.
Under the foregoing circumstances, any such allocation would
be necessary if the total sum available was notenough to pay to
the bargaining unit employees the full wage increases in dispute.
The record still does not show whether the sum of $423,500
is enough to cover these wage increases, and the record before us
does not disclose why the parties were unable to agree on its
disbursement.

We only know that the parties did not agree, and

the matter has been referred back to us for a determination.
Accordingly, it is our determination and Award, based on the
nature of the case before us and leading to our June 1986 Award,
that the total available $423,500 be first applied to satisfy
fully or to satisfy as much as possible the wage increases for
the bargaining unit employees called for under the collective
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bargaining agreement for 1984 in 1985 and the wage increase called
for under the collective bargaining agreement for the year 1985.

Eric X. Schmertz
Chai/rman

Frank McKinney
Concurring

Herbert A. Rothman
Dissenting
DATED: October 27, 1986
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award. .^
,—~^—>

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

t&te^^-^^t
/

I, Frank McKinney do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
I Herbert A. Rothman do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Clove Lakes Nursing Home ft Health
Related Facility

and

\

Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing
Home & Allied Services Union, SEIU
AFL-CIO

In a c c o r d a n c e w i t h A r t i c l e s J and K of the c o l l e c t i v e
b a r g a i n i n g agreement between the above-named Employer and Union,
the Employer o r i g i n a l l y claimed before the Undersigned Reimbursemont Review Panel that it is unaffordable to meet the wage increases under said contract for the years 1984 and 1985.
However, during the course of the hearings, following

:

I

:
j

or • sc r.tii ti on of its economic case for the year 1984 and following
the Union's rebuttal of that case, the Employer conceded that it
was affordable to pay the contract wage increase for 1984 in 1984.;
It agreed to make those payments pursuant to the contract and
withdrew its petition herein for relief from the 1984 wage increase in the year 1984.
That left in dispute the affordability of the Employer for
the 1984 wage increase in the year 1985 and for the 1985 contractual wage increase.
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the
Employer is affordable to the extent of, and has available for
payment of the 1984 increase in 1985 and the 1985 wage increase,
the total sum of $423,500 (four hundred and twenty three thousand
and five hundred dollars.)
The Employer and the Union are directed to meet forthwith
to work out how and to whom this money is to be paid and on what
schedule.

If the Employer and the Union fail to agree within

,

*

**
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ten days from the date of this AWARD, the matters shall be
referred back to this Panel for those determinations.

For

V

that purpose we retain jurisdiction.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chai/man

Herbert Rothman
Dissenting

I
Frank McKinney
Concurring
DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York ) ss. :
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described ip-and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York ) ss. :
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Herbert Rothman do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual describe^ in ari^who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED: June
1986
STATE OF New York )ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Frank McKinney do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator tha€ I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

•f
t*

In The Matter Of The Arbitration Between
CLOVE LAKES NURSING HOME & HEALTH
RELATED FACILITY,
DISSENTING OPINION
-andLOCAL 144, HOTEL, HOSPITAL, NURSING HOME
& ALLIED SERVICES UNION, SEIU, AFL-CIO.

On June 3, 1986, I was presented with a copy of the
award in this matter, duly executed by Eric J. Schmertz as
Chairman, and Frank McKinney, as the Union's Panel member.
McKinney signed the award as concurring.

Mr.

At that time the award

was complete and effective.
Now however, Mr. McKinney has chosen to pen a document
which he entitles, "Concurring Opinion".
improper.

That document is

It was not issued as part of the award of this Panel.

Indeed, it is nothing but an after-the-fact effort to re-write
the Panel's award.
Without any notice of Mr. McKinney's so-called
Concurring Opinion, I executed the award and indicated that I
dissented.

The reason for my dissent was that I disagreed that

the Employer has as much as $423,500.00 for payment of the 1984
wage increases in 1985 and the 1985 wage increase.
It is not true, as the so-called Concurring Opinion
would have it, that this award leaves to another date any
decision as to what relief should be granted in the event that
Medicaid reimbursement is not used to pay wage increases, in
whole or in part, to union members.

Neither is it true that the

//
f

Panel has agreed to or may, in fact, consider arguments related
to additional relief, either to be granted or denied the
Employer, in the event current Medicaid reimbursement is
inadequate to fund wage increases.
The award of this Panel is clear on its fact.

It

recited that the Employer has only $423,500.00 to pay any wage
increases —

both the 1984 and the 1985 —

in 1985.

If the total

dollar amount necessary to pay full contractual wage increases is
greater than the sum found by the award, the award plainly holds
that the Employer is relieved of such obligations over and above
$423,500.00.
The only matter with respect to which this Panel has
retained jurisdiction pursuant to agreement among the panel is
set forth in the fiscal paragraph of the award; namely, to
resolve disputes about how and to whom the $423,500.00 is to be
paid to both union and non-union employees and on what schedule.
As set forth above, because I believe that the Employer
is affordable to a lesser extent than the ! 23, 500.Q£f^found by
the Panel, I respectfully dissent.

Dated:.
June *

1986

STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, HERBERT ROTHMAN, do hereby affirm
that I am the individual described in and
instrument.

s Arbitrator
uted this

-.
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Dean Eric J. Schmertz
Hofstra Law School
1000 Fulton Avenue
Hemptstead, New York 11550
Mr. Frank McKinney
Local 144, SEIU
233 West 49th Street
New York, New York 10019
Herbert Rothman, Esq.
401 Broadway
New York, New York 10013

Re:

Clove Lakes
Nursing Home & Health Related
Facility and Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing
Home & Allied Services Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO
(Reimbursement Panel Proceedings)

Gentlemen:
In accordance with the arrangements made in the
August 22, 1986 conference call in the above matter, in which
Dean Schmertz and counsel participated, this letter brief sets
forth the Union's position as to the action to be taken by the
Panel pursuant to its retained jurisdiction in this matter.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS MATTER
The Panel issued its initial award in this matter on
June 3, 1986, in which it found that Clove Lakes had $423,500
available to pay the 1984 wage increase in 1985.
1.
its

Clove Lakes sought relief from the Panel with respect to
obligation to pay the full 6-1/2% contractual 1984 wage
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Inasmuch as the Panel was not informed of the actual
amount necessary to fund the 1984 wage increase in 1985, the
Panel did not know whether the $423,500 it found available
was
less than adequate, more than adequate, or adequate to provide
for the increase. It therefore directed the parties to meet and
attempt to reach agreement with respect to the payment of the
wage increase.
Failing agreement, the Panel retained jurisdiction in this matter.
In a concurring opinion, dated June 3, 1986, the
Union's Panelist, Frank McKinney, explained that he concurred in
the Panel's award on the basis of his understanding that the
award did nothing more than determine that there was then
available the sum of $423,500 in Medicaid reimbursement with
which to pay wage increases in 1985. Beyond that, the Panel left
to another date "a decision as to what, if any, relief it should
grant in the event that such Medicaid reimbursement is not used
to pay
such wage increases to Local 144 bargaining unit
employees, or in the event that such Medicaid reimbursement is
inadequate to pay such wage increases." If requested, the Panel
would consider arguments with respect to "what, if any, further
award should issue, including the argument that under the
circumstances of this case, the Employer should not be granted
any relief from the contractual obligation to pay the full amount
of such increases to Local 144 bargaining unit employees even if
its Medicaid reimbursement is inadequate to fund such wage
increases."
After the Panel's initial award, the parties met, but
were unable to agree with respect to the payment of the 1984 wage
increase in 1985. Based on wage increase calculations which the
Union requested from the Employer, the Union established that it
(footnote continued from previous page)
increase.
Ultimately, it withdrew its request for relief with
respect to the payment of that wage increase in 1984.
This left
before the Panel the question of the payment of the 1984 wage
increase in 1985 (no evidence was ever submitted, or argument
made to the Panel, with respect to the payment of the 1984 wage
increase in 1986). The Panel concluded that there was $423,500
available to pay wage increases in 1985.
2.
In a dissenting opinion, dated more than a week later (June
11, 1986), Herbert Rothman, the Employer's Panelist, disagreed
with Mr. McKinney's view of the award. According to Rothman, the
award relieved the Employer of any wage increase obligations in
1985 over and above the $423,500 which the initial award held was
available to pay wage increases.
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would cost the Employer at most $369,000 to pay the full amount
of the 1984 wage increase in 1985 to all bargaining unit
employees.
It therefore took the position that the Employer
should pay the full amount of the 1984 wage increase in 1985 to
the bargaining unit employees. The Employer did not dispute the
Union's $369,000 calculation.
It stated, however, that it
intended to pay the same wage increase to non-bargaining unit
employees as it paid to bargaining unit employees and that it
would cost approximately $523,000 to pay both bargaining unit and
non-bargaining unit employees the full 6-1/2% 1984 wage increase
in 1985.
It therefore proposed to reduce the bargaining unit
employees' wage increase from 6-1/2% to approximately 5-1/4% and
to pay this amount to both non-bargaining unit and bargaining
unit employees.
Unable to agree, the Union, by letter dated July 9,
1986, requested that the Panel reconvene pursuant to its retained
jurisdiction.
Prior to July 9, 1986, the Union advised counsel for
the Employer that its Panel member and Dean Schmertz would be
available on July 10, 1986 for this purpose.
The Employer did
not choose to appear before the Panel on the morning of July 10th
and Mr. McKinney was unable to meet on the afternoon of that day,
although, with the exception of a couple of hours during which
Mr. McKinney would be in transit to a vacation in Tennessee, he
agreed to remain available for a telephone conference call and to
make himself available for a hearing on subsequent dates,
returning if necessary to New York.
Ultimately, a

hearing was

scheduled for

August 22,

1986.
Meanwhile, on July 28, 1986, United States District
Court Judge William C. Conner, in contempt proceedings brought by
the Union against the Employer for its failure to comply with a
prior order and judgment of the court directing it to pay the
1984 wage increase, ordered the Employer to pay the full amount
of the
1984 wage
increase then
unpaid, with
interest,
irrespective of the pendency of the proceedings before the Panel.
The Employer subsequently complied with the Court's
order to the extent of paying the 1985 portion of the 1984 wage
increase to bargaining unit employees.
It has not paid either
3.
The Employer paid the 1984 portion of the 1984 wage
increase shortly before the Judge entered his July 28, 1986 order
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the interest on the 1984 wage increase, or the portion of the
1984 wage increase due for the period from January through midMay, 1986.
The August 22, 1986 hearing before the Panel could
not be held because of the illness of Dean Schmertz on that date.
Instead, it was agreed in a conference call that day that no
further evidence was required in this matter and that the parties
would make their arguments in writing with respect to appropriate
further action by the Panel. For the reasons set forth below,
it is the Union's position that the Panel should dismiss the
Employer's request for relief in this matter.
THE ISSUES
Preliminarily, it should be noted that since the
Union's July 9, 1986 letter was sent invoking the retained
jurisdiction of the Panel, the Employer, as indicated above, has
in fact paid the 1984 wage increase in 1985 to bargaining unit
employees.
The issue of whether the Employer should be relieved
of the obligation to do so is thus, in the Union's view, moot.
Since the Employer withdrew its request for relief from the
obligation to pay the 1984 wage increase in 1984, and since it
never put before the Panel the issue of relief from the
obligation to pay the 1984 wage increase in 1986, it seems to the
Union that there are no issues presently before the Panel
requiring Panel action.
Nevertheless, we understand that the Employer intends
to request an award from the Panel permitting it to take back
from the bargaining unit employees — through a Panel authorized
recoupment —
an amount equal to the difference between the full
amount of the contractual 1984 wage increase it paid under court
order to bargaining unit employees in 1985 (6-1/2%) and the
percentage amount of the 1984 wage increase it contends it was
obliged to pay in 1985 (5-1/4%). The Union has anticipated and
addressed below some of the issues raised by such a request.

(footnote continued from previous page)
in the contempt proceedings.
4.
The Union has informed the
Employer that its failure in
these respects to comply with Judge Conner's Order will be the
subject of further contempt proceedings before the Judge.
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1.

Added Staff Issues

It was undisputed at the hearing that whatever
shortfall may have been experienced by the Employer in 1985 was
due to the Employer's addition of staff in that year and its
failure to file an added staff appeal with the State of New York
with respect to the staff added. Under the circumstances, there
are three separate and independent reasons why the Employer
should not be relieved of the obligation to pay bargaining unit
employees the full amount of the 1984 wage increase due them in
1985. These are as follows:
(a)

The General Added Staff Issue Has
Not Yet Been Resolved

The
general
question of
whether reimbursement
shortfalls due
to added staff costs support a claim for
reimbursement-based relief was the subject of extensive testimony
and evidence
in the Clearview and Shoreview Nursing Home
Reimbursement Panel proceedings. The Union took the position in
Clearview/Shoreview that added staff costs were not "labor costs"
within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement and
that such costs could not support a claim for reimbursement-based
relief. The employers took a contrary position.
An interim award was rendered by the Panel Chairman
in Clearview/Shoreview declining to decide the added staff issue
at that time, but providing for the Panel to reconvene to make
that decision. The Panel has not yet reconvened for this purpose
in Clearview/Shoreview.
Given the time and effort devoted to the added staff
issue in
Clearview/Shoreview and the extensive evidentiary
presentation and argument made with respect to the added staff
issue, as well as the thorough briefing of that issue, if the
general added staff issue is to be resolved, it should be
resolved by deciding Clearview/Shoreview.
Alternatively, the
Panel should review the evidence, arguments and briefs submitted
in Clearview/Shoreview before rendering a decision in the instant
case.
The
Employer
Panelist's
dissenting
opinion
notwithstanding, the Panel in its initial award in the instant
case could not have decided this issue sub silentio. Indeed, for
the Panel to have done so would have been a grossly irresponsible
act and it is nothing short of insulting to attribute such an act
to the Panel Chairman or to its Union member.
is

the

For the reasons set forth in Clearview/Shoreview, it
Union's position that reimbursement shortfalls due to
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added staff costs do
based relief.
(b)

not entitle

an employer to reimbursement-

Under the Particular Facts of This Case, Relief Based
on Added Staff Costs Should Not Be Granted
(1)

The Staff Added in this Case Was Added Beyond
the Date for Which, Under Any View of the Added
Staff Issue, Relief May Be Granted

A review of the evidence and testimony submitted in
Clearview/Shoreview makes it clear that while the Union never
agreed to consider added staff costs as "labor costs" within the
meaning of
the reimbursement provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement and thus never agreed to their inclusion in
a shortfall analysis, the employers at various times during the
negotiations attempted to insert provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement that would have that effect.
Each time,
however, they withdrew those provisions.
Nevertheless, in none
of the provisions inserted by the employers did they seek a
"labor cost" inclusion for staff added after March 31, 1984, the
expiration date of the prior collective bargaining
agreement.
Rather, in the employers' own view of what they were seeking in
negotiations with respect to added staff, the employers sought
only to include the costs of staff added up to March 31, 1984.
In none of the Reimbursement Panel proceedings thus
far, has any employer claimed that the cost of staff added after
March 31, 1984 should be considered as a labor cost.
Only Clove
Lakes has taken this position. It is axiomatic that Clove Lakes
should not be permitted to get, through the vehicle of the
instant Reimbursement Panel proceedings, more than the employers
sought in negotiations.
(2)

The Employer's Own Conduct Has Prevented It From
Being Fully Reimbursed For Its Added Staff

The evidence in this matter is clear and unrebutted
that the Employer failed to file an added staff appeal with the
State of New York for staff added in 1985.
The evidence is
similarly clear and unrebutted that had the Employer done so it
would likely have received added staff reimbursement for its
added staff costs.
Moreover, the evidence is clear and
5.
Indeed, the unrebutted testimony in this proceeding is that
receipt of the added staff monies for which the Employer failed
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unrebutted that, even as late as the conclusion of the initial
hearing in this matter on May 30, 1986, had the Employer filed
the necessary appeal, it would likely have received such added
staff reimbursement.
That the Employer seeks to have
the employees
represented by the Union pay through reduced contractual terms
for a shortfall attributable to its own failure to apply for
available reimbursement is nothing less than outrageous.
Its
position in this respect is totally lacking in equity and
represents the
ultimate perversion
of
the
reimbursement
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Surely, an
employer which has failed to take reasonable steps to obtain
reimbursement to which it is entitled may not be heard to claim a
reimbursement-based shortfall
on the
basis of
which the
bargaining unit employees must suffer.
In this respect, the decision of Arbitrator Margery
Gootnick in Local 144 v. CNH Management Associates (Concourse
Nursing Home) is illustrative.
In CNH, Arbitrator Gootnick
stated, among other things, that:
The Arbitrator is persuaded that, when the
Employer agreed to the parity provisions in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement [parity
reimbursement was at issue in that arbitration] , they became contractually bound to
take all [emphasis in original] necessary
steps to secure reimbursement from the
State.

Any other interpretation of the parity
provisions would render the parity language
meaningless and would enable the Employer
to avoid the collectively bargained obligation.
In CNH, the Union argued that the well-established
prevention doctrine required an award in favor of the Union.
Under the particular circumstances of the CNH case, the Arbitra(footnote continued from previous page)
to apply would not only eliminate any claimed shortfall, but
would result in a substantial reimbursement windfall to the
Employer.
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tor directed CNH to immediately complete its pending application
for the necessary reimbursement.
Under the prevention doctrine as applied to the facts
of this case, the failure of the Employer to even apply for
available added staff reimbursement excuses the requirement that
it be fully reimbursed for its 1985 labor costs and warrants the
dismissal of its application for relief.
The prevention doctrine, which is based on the
overriding principle of every contract that there is an implied
covenant of good faith performance and fair dealing, requires a
party not to act so as to defeat the purpose of the contract, or
deprive the other party of the benefits of its provisions. Kirke
La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87 (1933); see
also, Filner v. Shapiro, 633 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1980). Where
the provision is a conditional one, the requirement not to defeat
the purpose or deprive a party of the benefits includes an
obligation not to frustrate the occurrence of the condition. See
e.g., Arc Electric Const. Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 24 N.Y.2d
99, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 129, 132 (1969); International Fire Co. v.
Kingston Tr. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 406, 410, 189 N.Y.S. 2d 911, 913
(1959).
In the instant case, when the Union agreed to the
reimbursement provisions of the collective bargaining agreement,
the Employer concomitantly agreed to take all necessary steps to
procure such reimbursement since only the Employer can apply for
and receive
reimbursement.
Accordingly, integral to the
agreement that wage increases are subject to reimbursement is the
understanding that the Employer is under the obligation to take
all steps necessary to procure such reimbursement. As stated by
the New York Court of Appeals:
The law looks with disfavor on contractual
provisions that would allow one party, by
its own unilateral act, to avoid its obligations by preventing or hindering the
[fulfillment] of the conditions to the
contract.
Arc Electric Const. Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 24 N.Y.2d 99,
299 N.Y.S. 2d 129, 132 (1969).
To permit the Employer here to
unilaterally cease taking all
necessary steps
to procure
reimbursement is to permit the foreseeable consequence of denying
the employees the wage increases due them in compensation for
their continued work.
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Any ambiguity on this point, if any could exist, must
be resolved against the Employer. It is a basic rule of contract
interpretation that
ambiguous language should be construed
against the party who proposed it.
Elkouri and Elkouri, How
Arbitration Works, supra at 318-319. Here, where the Employer's
principal, as President of the Southern New York Residential
Health Care Facilities Association, was one of the principal
proponents of the subject to reimbursement provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement, and the Employer's counsel was
the principal draftsman of those provisions, any doubt as to the
existence of the obligation to take all necessary steps to
procure reimbursement must be resolved in favor of the Union.
To the extent that the obligation is viewed as a
conditional one —
whether as a condition precedent or a
condition subsequent — the general rule of contracts is that
when a party has occasioned the non-performance of a condition,
the condition is excused. Shear v. National Rifle Association of
America, 606 F.2d 1251 (D.C.Cir. 1979).
Accordingly, to the
extent that the Employer in the instant case prevented by its
conduct the
receipt of
what it believes to be adequate
reimbursement to fully cover wage increases in
1985, the
condition that such reimbursement be obtained is excused.
Nor are there any equitable considerations which
justify excusing the Employer from the obligation to apply for
necessary reimbursement.
A party to a contract, especially one
as sophisticated as the Employer in the instant case, must be
presumed to have agreed to the legal and practical consequences
of the obligations it has assumed. The Employer here assumed the
obligations and risks which are inherent in and flow from the
reimbursement provisions of the collective bargaining agreement:
(1) that it is obligated to take all necessary steps to procure
reimbursement, and (2) that, if it prevents reimbursement, the
absence of such reimbursement will be excused.
2.

The Retroactivity Issue

As is the case with respect to the general added
staff issue, the retroactivity issue was fully addressed in
Clearview/Shoreview. As established in Clearview/Shoreview, the
collective bargaining agreement gives Panel decisions retroactive
effect for not more than sixty (60) days prior to the date of
decision.
The Employer here did not even request relief under
the reimbursement provisions
of the
collective bargaining
agreement until well into 1985.
Then, despite the Union's
repeated warnings about its delay in proceeding on its request,

Dean Eric J. Schmertz
Mr. Frank McKinney
Herbert Rothman, Esq.
September 5, 1986
Tenth Page
did not open its case to the Panel until late March, 1986, at
which time it was under the pressure of the judicial proceedings
before Judge Conner.
Under the circumstances, to the extent that the
Employer now seeks a retroactive recoupment of wage increases
paid in
1985 to
bargaining unit
employees, it
is not
contractually entitled to such relief.
Nor can there be any
equitable basis for granting such relief.
For a more complete
discussion of this issue, the Panel
is referred
to the
Clearview/Shoreview matter.
The Panel is also referred to the
correspondence introduced in evidence in the instant Panel
proceedings with respect to the Employer's delay in proceeding on
its request for relief.
In addition to the above, the Union wishes the Panel
to be aware of its position with respect to following issues:
3.

The Non-Bargaining Unit Wage Increase

The Union understands that, in or around August 1986,
after it invoked the retained jurisdiction of the Panel and after
Judge Conner ordered the Employer to pay the unpaid portion of
the 1984 wage increase to bargaining unit employees, the Employer
decided to make a lump sum payment to its non-bargaining unit
employees which it refers to as a 1984 non-bargaining unit wage
increase in 1985.
The Union understands further that the Employer
intends to seek from this Panel a partial recoupment of the 1984
bargaining unit wage increase in 1985 in order to fund this 1986
non-bargaining unit payment. This, of course, the Union opposes.
While it is true that the collective bargaining
agreement provides that the Employer may be
credited for
reimbursement shortfall purposes with increases in wages and
benefits to non-bargaining unit employees which are not greater
than the increases in labor costs under the agreement, nothing in
the collective bargaining agreement requires an Employer to pay
wage increases to non-bargaining unit employees.
Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement clearly
contemplates wage increases made to non-bargaining unit employees
in the ordinary course.
What has been paid to non-bargaining
unit employees in 1986 is in effect a bonus which the Employer
calls a 1984 in 1985 wage increase.
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Unlike its bargaining unit employees, to whom it was
contractually required to pay specific wage increases in 1985,
the Employer was under no obligation to pay its non-bargaining
unit employees a wage increase in 1985. The Employer could just
as well have called the payment it made to its non-bargaining
unit employees in 1986 a 1986 wage increase.
In fact, that
characterization would have been more accurate.
The strict year-by-year approach that the employers
have adamantly insisted upon in connection with the reimbursement
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement should not be
permitted to be subverted because it now suits the Employer's
interest to
call the payment made to non-bargaining unit
employees in 1986 a 1984 in 1985 wage increase and thus claim a
1985 shortfall based on that payment.
Having paid the bargaining unit employees the 1984
wage increase in 1985 which ultimately was the subject of the
application for relief pending before the Panel, and it being
undisputed that it was adequately reimbursed for that purpose,
the Panel need not, and indeed has no jurisdiction to, consider a
request that it direct a recoupment of such increase so as to
reimburse the Employer for the payment it made in 1986 to its
non-bargaining unit employees after the retained jurisdiction of
the Panel was invoked by the Union and after Judge Conner's order
in the contempt proceedings.
4.

The 1984 Wage Increase in 1986 and the Interest Assessed
By the Court Are Not Matters Before the Panel

The 1984 wage increase has now been paid in 1984 and
1985. To the extent that it has not been paid in 1986, this is a
subject for the Court and has never been an issue before this
Panel.
To the extent that interest has been imposed against the
Employer for its non-payment of that wage increase, this is
similarly a subject for the court and has never been put before
this Panel. Nor could such interest under any circumstances be
considered a "labor cost" subject to this Panel's jurisdiction.
5.

The 1985 Wage Increase is Not Before the Panel

While it is understandable that in the context in
which the Panel rendered its initial award it might have
considered it appropriate to conclude that the $423,500 available
to pay wage increases in 1985 was available to pay the 1984 and
1985 wage increases in 1985, the fact is that payment of the 1985
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wage increase was never an issue before the Panel. The issue of
the payment of the 1985 wage increase is at this point still
before the Impartial Chairman and there is no pending application
for relief from the obligation to pay that wage increase.
The
Panel should therefore make it clear that in determining that
there was $423,500 available to pay wage increases in 1985, the
Panel was not ruling in advance on issues that may yet come
before it with respect to the 1985 wage increase.
CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully
requested that the Panel deny any application for relief with
respect to the 1984 wage increase in 1985; refuse to consider as
not before it at this time any application for relief with
respect to the 1985 wage increase in 1985; deny any relief with
respect to the 1984 wage increase in 1986 and the interest on the
1984 wage increase on the ground that no proper application for
any such relief is before it and that no such relief has ever
been considered by it, and on the additional ground that both of
these matters are properly before the Court; and take such other
and further action consistent with the above as the Panel may
deem just and proper in the premises.
Respectfully yours,

.rwirixBluestein

^7

IB:phk
cc: Jonathan L. Sulds, Esq.

6.
In any event, as in the case of the added staff issue, this
issue and issues 2 and 3 above become academic when the added
staff money for which the Employer has not applied is taken into
account.
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906-7941

L15278/00001

Reimbursement Review Panel
c/o Honorable Eric J. Schmertz
Dean, Hofstra School of Law
Law School Building, room 202
California Avenue
Hempstead, New York 11550
Re:

CLOVE LAKES NURSING HOME
— 1985 Relief Request

Gentlemen:
This letter is submitted on behalf of Clove Lakes
Nursing Home ("Clove Lakes" or "Employer") and sets forth
its position in connection with those matters with respect to which the Panel retained jurisdiction following
its June 3, 1986 award. By that award, the Panel decreed
that Clove Lakes has only $423,500 to pay for any wage
increases in calendar year 1985. Put another way, the
Panel's award clearly holds that no increase in labor
costs for calendar year 1985 may exceed the $423,500 figure .
A dispute has now arisen between Clove Lakes and
the Union with respect to which Clove Lakes employees are
to receive wage increase payments and in what amounts.
More specifically, it is Clove Lakes' position that the
$423,500 available for wage increases is payable to union
and non-union employees alike, and in the same percentage
increase. The effect of this would be that Clove Lakes
would make a wage increase payment for the 1984 wage increase in 1985 of 5-1/2% approximately to union and nonunion personnel, and would make no 1985 increase payments.
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The Union, by contrast, contends that the entire
sum of money found by the Panel to be available for wage
increases must be paid to union employees. The $423,500
total, the Union contends, is more than sufficient to
pay the 6-1/2% 1984 wage increase throughout calendar
year 1985.
We show below that the Union's position is frivolous and disingenuous. The parties specifically negotiated that non-union costs were part of overall labor
costs. They committed themselves to the proposition that
non-union labor cost increases, which did not exceed
union labor cost increases, had to be fully reimbursed
by the State of New York, failing which the Employer would
be entitled to a reduction in overall labor costs, pursuant to the terms of the Reimbursement Clause of the parties' agreement.
However, before turning to the lack of merit to
the Union's position, it is appropriate to trace the procedural history of this matter from the time of issuance
of the Chairman's award. The Panel's award was signed
and affirmed on June 3, 1985. At that time, Mr. Frank
McKinney, the Union's panelist, simply signed the award
as concurring. Subsequently, Mr. McKinney constructed
an opinion which, as Mr. Rothman's dissenting opinion
properly points out, was an after-the-fact attempt to rewrite the Panel's award.
Based on the instruction of the Chairman, the parties met on June 25, 1986 to work out, in the terms of
the Chairman's award, "[H]ow and to whom this money is to
be paid and on what schedule". At that time, Clove Lakes
provided the Union with a proposed schedule of payments
to all employees of the $423,500, together with supporting papers. On July 9, 1986, the Union notified Clove
Lakes that it would not agree to the schedule of payments
proposed, because it objected that the schedule included
payments to non-union employees together with union employees. The Union then pressed for a contempt citation
before Judge Conner in connection with the United States
District Court's confirmation of the Rappaport award to
the effect that -- absent this Panel's proceedings -Clove Lakes was obligated to pay 6-1/2% wage increases
for 1984 in calendar year 1985. Significantly, the
Union's effort to press for contempt came at a time when
Mr. McKinney was unavailable for further Panel proceedings — a fact not previously disclosed to Clove Lakes.
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Rather than be placed in a potential contempt situation, Clove Lakes made payments totalling the entire
6-1/2% wage increase to bargaining unit members for calendar year 1985. At the same time, Clove Lakes made payments totalling 5-1/2% pay increase for all non-bargaining unit members for calendar year 1985. Both sets of
payments were made on a lump sum basis. It is undisputed that the total amount of money expended by Clove
Lakes is in excess of the $423,500 which the Panel found
Clove Lakes possessed. In other words, Clove Lakes has
now incrred labor costs for 1985 that, according to the
Chairman's award herein, are not reimbursed. A fortiori,
under the Panel's award, Clove Lakes is entitle"d"~to' relief,
Thus, here, we request that the Panel direct that
Clove Lakes' bargaining unit members' pay be reduced by
the amount in which each bargaining member was previously
overpaid for 1985 — that is, that the difference between
the 6-1/2% 1984 wage increase in 1985 already paid and
the 5-1/2% wage increase for which the Panel has said
Clove Lakes is affordable, be subtracted over a period of
time the Panel may, in its discretion, set.
Without such relief, the Union's unsupportable
position that labor reimbursement from the State of New
York to Clove Lakes is available to pay wage increases
to union members in the first instance will, de_ facto,
be sustained. And as we now show, such a result would
be in violation of the specific terms of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement, as well as the governing law.
All concerned with this proceeding know without
doubt that Clove Lakes and other Southern New York facilities bargained for and received the specific assurance that non-union labor costs had to be fully reimbursed, along with union labor costs, or the Employer
would be entitled to relief under the terms of the Reimbursement Clause of the parties' agreement. The
penultimate paragraph of the Reimbursement Clause provides :
"It is understood that the employer may
increase wages and other benefits of
non-bargaining unit employees during
the period April 1, 1984 through March
31, 1987. To the extent that such increased wages and benefits are no
greater than the increases in labor
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"costs under the terms of this agreement,
it is understood and agreed that these
non-bargaining unit terms and conditions
of employment must also be fully reimbursed by the State of New York."
Unless the parties meant by this language that a
facility with a shortfall should reduce labor costs for
union and non-union employees alike, in equal proportion,
then the language has no meaning. Put another way, the
parties plainly intended that in a situation such as here
the available reimbursement dollars would be paid to
union and non-union employees at the same percentage of
total salary. The Union's after-the-fact position simply
ignores the parties' clear language and cannot be sustained.
Significantly, in each Panel proceeding to-date,
the Union itself has figured non-union costs as part of
a facility's overall labor costs for which, by agreement,
there must be full reimbursement or relief will be granted.
The glaring inconsistency between the Union's methodology
and its new position amply demonstrates that its contentions are constructed to serve political ends and not
the agreement between the parties.
Moreover, one would have thought all this was
settled in any event when the Reimbursement Review Panel
here was modelled on the Labor Cost Review Panel. That
body, existing between 1978 and 1981, time and again rejected New York State's position that the State's reimbursement methodology was required only to reimburse facilities for the costs of union labor, holding instead
that all labor costs were properly reimbursable.
But it is not the model of the Labor Cost Review
Panel alone which compels rejection of the Union's argument here. In Haven Manor Nursing Home, New York State
specifically stipulated that under applicable reimbursement regulations (which apply with full force here), reimbursement from New York State had to be available to
union and non-union employees alike and that the State
could not meet its obligations under the statute by reimbursing a facility for union labor costs alone. A
copy of the Haven Manor stipulation is enclosed.
Thus, as a matter of contract and as a matter of
law, the $423,500 which this Panel found is the sum total available to Clove Lakes to pay increased wages to
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its employees in calendar year 1985 must be paid to all
employees without regard to representation by the Union.
As set forth above, Clove Lakes has already advanced monies to pay non-union employees wage increases
for 1985 while, at the same time, under threat of contempt citation, paying a full 6-1/2% wage increase to
union employees. The Reimbursement Clause provides in
its first paragraph that Clove Lakes "[M]ust receive
full reimbursement from the State of New York . . .
for all its labor costs in order to implement the economic terms and conditions" of the agreement. The penultimate paragraph of the Reimbursement Clause continues that
"[T]o the extent that such increased wages and benefits
are no greater than the increases in the labor costs under the terms of this agreement, it is understood and
agreed that these bargaining unit terms and conditions
of employment must also be fully reimbursed by the State
of New York".
Unless Clove Lakes receives the relief requested,
namely, a reduction of currently paid union salaries in
an amount equal to the overpayment to union employees
for 1985, it will be out of pocket those costs and its
non-union labor costs will not have been fully reimbursed.
Because the agreement requires a different result, the
relief sought should be granted in all respects.
Respectfully, .
nat'han L. Sul'ds'
jls/eb
encls
cc:

Mr. Frank McKinney
Herbert Rothman, Esq.
Irwin Bluestein, Esq.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DANIEL CANTOR d/b/a HAVEN MANOR
HEALTH RELATED FACILITY,
Plaintiff,
ARTHUR Y. WEBB, Acting Commissioner
of the State of New York Department
of Social Services; and DAVID
AXELROD, M.D., Commissioner .of
the State of New York Department
of Health,
•,

STIPULATION OF
SETTLEMENT AND
DISMISSAL
82 Civ.

Defendants.

/
WHEREAS, an action has been commenced by Daniel
Cantor d/b/a Haven Manor Health Related Facility, plaintiff
for judgment declaring, among other things/ that plaintiff is
entitled to reimbursement for the costs of the District 1199
Pension Fund in its Medicaid program reimbursement rate; and
WHEREAS, it is the position of defendant Department
of Health that the memorandum of agreement entered into
between the State of New York and the Greater New York Health
Care Facilities Association

("GNYHCFA") dated April 4, 1981,
t
which provided for a Shortfall Annual Costs Supplement
("SACS"), was not intended to apply to new benefit programs
instituted by residential health care facilities for its
employees in order to provide those employees with the same
benefits provided to employees by other residential health
care facilities subject to a master union contract except for
those referenced as covered by the Turkus award; and

WHEREAS, defendants, the Department of Health was
not aware and not advised by GNYHCFA- at the time it entered
into the aforesaid memorandum of agreement that the plaintiff
was a party to an agreement with District 1199, National Union
of Hospital and Health,Care Employees, RWDSU, AFL-CIO
("District 1199") made August 26, 1980, which obligated the
plaintiff to initiate contributions to a National Pension Fund
for Hospital and Health Care Employees at master contract
levels; and
•WHEREAS, despite the foregoing, the defendant,
Department of Health believes that it is.bound by the terms of
the memorandum of agreement and that the plaintiff is in a
unique situation which justifies the application of the SACS
factor as set forth in the Department's agreement with GNYHCFA
to plaintiff's labor costs including the pension plan
contribution as provided for in its aforesaid'agreement with
District 1199, and to plaintiff's subsequent agreement with
District 1199 dated January 3, 1983; and
WHEREAS, the parties hereto, wish to settle this
action on the terms and conditions set forth herein:
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:
1.

The Department of Health expeditionsly will

apply SACS to the costs incurred by the plaintiff
under its agreements with District 1199, including
-2-

pension costs, and will promulgate, subject to the
approval of the Director of the Budget of the State
of New York as required by New York Public Health
Law § 2807 (2) (a), revised 1982 and 1983 provisional
Medicaid rates if warranted;
2.

Nothing herein shall be construed as a waiver of

plaintiff's right to have SACS applied to
plaintiff's 1984 Medicaid rate; and
3.

This action is hereby dismissed with prejudice

pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and without attorneys fees or costs by any
party against any other party.
Dated:

Februw?y

1983

(I

MARVIN NEIMAN; ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
39 Broadway
Suite 2518
New York, New York 10006
Tel. (212) 269-2225

Dated:

1983

ROBERT ABRAMS

Attorney General of the
State of New York
Attorney for Defendants
By:

SO ORDERED thi
day o

U.S.D.J.

.r 4

BARRIE L. GOLDSTEIN
Assistant Attorney General
Two World Trade Center
New York, New York 10047
Tel. (212) 488-4940

FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN CLERK'S OFFICE .
U.S. DISTRICT COURT F.'D.N.Y.
',\ 2 3 1?E-A

DANIEL CANTOR d/b/a HAVEN MANOR
HEALTH RELATED FACILITY,

%V

TIME A.M..
P.M..

Plaintiffs,
-against-

STIPULATION

ARTHUR Y. WEBB, Acting Commissioner
of THE STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES; and DAVID AXELROD,
M.D., COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

82 Civ. 3741 (ILG)

Defendants.

WHEREAS, a motion has been filed by the plaintiff dated
January 6, 1983, for an Order adjudging the defendants in civil
contempt of this Court for the alleged failure to comply with
an Order of this Court dated Kay 9, 1983;
WHEREAS, the defendants do not admit the allegations made
ir. support cf the notior.; end
WHEREAS, the parties hereto wish to settle this motion on
the terms and conditions set forth herein:
NOV:, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:
1.

The Department of Health will e.vpeditiously ?rrly

S.-.Cs to pension crests incurred by the plaintiff in 1983 for
non-union employees, and will promulgate, subject.to the
approval of the Director of the Budget of the State of New York
as required by New York Public Health Law § 2807(2) (a), revised
1983 provisional Kedicaid rates if warranted.

2.

The pension costs reportedly incurred, by plaintiff

for 1983 is $53,702.

Subject to audit, these costs will bp

.used by the Department in applying SACs and issuing revised
.provisional Medicaid rates in accordance with paragraph 1
hereof.
3.

The motion for contempt is hereby withdrawn with

prejudice and without attorneys fees or costs by any party
against any other party.
Dated:

New York, New York
March tf , 1984

MARVIN NEIMAN, LSQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff t
39/Broadway, Suite 2510
NeV York, New York 10006
(212) 269-2225
Dated:

New York, New York
March (g , 1984

ROBERT ABRAMS
Attorney General of the
State of New York
Attornev for Defer.f-~r.tE
By:

BARRIE L. GGIi)STEIN
Assistant Attorney General
Two World Trade Center
New York, New York 10047
(212) 488-4940
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NEW YORK, N. Y. 1OO13-3O53

COUNSELORS AT
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AARDN SELIGSDN
HERBERT A. RDTHMAN
MARTIN S. ROTHMAN
JEFFREY E. ROTHMAN
AL.YNE I. DIAMOND
BARBARA BABBAGH

June 13, 1986

Dean Eric J. Schmertz
Hofstra Law School
1000 Fulton Avenue
Hempstead, NewYork 11550
Re: In the matter of the Arbitration
between Clove Lakes Nursing Home &
Health Related Facility and Local
144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home &
Allied Services Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO
Dear Mr. Schmertz:
Enclosed please find the duly executed "Concurrence" of
Frank McKinney with regard to the above captioned matter
which was executed by him and delivered to me on June 3, 1986.
I also enclose the executed "Dissent" of the undersigned which
was signed by me on June 3, 1986.
In view of the highly improper "after-the-fact" alleged
"Concurring Opinion" of Frank McKinney I enclose herewith a
Dissenting Opinion.

HAR:bjs
Enc.
cc: Mr. Frank McKinney
Mr. Irwin Bluestein
John Sulds, Esq.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Chemical Workers
Union, Local 560

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Davis & Geek
(American Cyanamid Company)
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Jane Abbruscato? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company plant in Danbury,
Connecticut on March 26, 1986 at which time Ms. Abbruscato,
hereinafter referred to as the grievant and representatives
of the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was waived.

The Arbitrator's

The Union and Company filed post-hearing

briefs.
The grievant was discharged for "insubordination" due to
her refusal or failure to follow the instructions of a guard regarding where to park her car in the plant parking lot, and for
"instigating, leading and condoning" a work stoppage on December
10, 1985.
While I do not find her blameless, and though I find her
responsible for a measure of condonation during the period of
unauthorized cessation of work by 25 - 30 employees, I do not
find a sufficient quantity of evidence to support the balance
of the charges against her or to support a conclusion that her
activities rose to the level of insubordination or responsibility
for instigating or leading a work stoppage which would justify
the penalty of discharge.
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On the day in question, the grievant was the highest
Union officer in the plant, serving as Acting President.

In

the parking lot she was told by the guard that her car was
wrongly parked.

He asked her to move it elsewhere.

She did

not do so, stating that she was late and would move it later.
In that respect she was unresponsive to the guard's request
and uncooperative with the Company's then newly implemented
parking rules.

But the guard did not order or direct her to

relocate her car and he did not warn her of the disciplinary
consequences of a refusal or failure to comply.
Insubordination requires a direct order by supervision,
an overt refusal to comply or a refusal by inaction in the face
of the direct order.

And generally, insubordination is the

proper conclusion when the supervisor accompanies his order
with a clear warning that refusal or failure to comply will
result in disciplinary action.

None of these requisite condi-

tions, separately or jointly took place in the instant case.
I fault the grievant for her cavalier attitude, but I cannot
find that she was defiant, disrespectful or contemptuous of
the guard's supervisory authority, or that she refused to follow
his orders.
The Company also has the burden of showing that the grievant instigated, led and/or condoned the actions of the 25 to
30 employees when they left their work places and congregated
in the personnel office to protest the Company's new parking
rules.
Setting aside speculation, conjecture and circumstantial
suspicion, the probative evidence adduced falls short of meeting the burden.

There is no question that the grievant planned
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to protest the new parking rules; that she announced that she
was going to the personnel office to protest and that she asked
two employees if they wished to accompany her there, without
seeking permission of their supervisor.

But I do not find an

adequate evidentiary basis to link her to or hold her causally
responsible for instigating or leading the rest of the group to
stop work and to go to the personnel

office.

In the absence of evidence of statements or direction by
her to the balance of the employees, I find it plausible to conclude that the group of employees, also unquestionably angry with
the Company's new parking rules, and seeing or hearing the grievant's plan to go to the office to protest, decided as a group
or by encouragement from others in the group, to go along too.
Of course it is possible that they did so at the grievant's
urging or direction, but the evidentiary link establishing that
is missing and a separate decision by the employees to stop work
and demonstrate in the personnel office cannot be ruled out,
especially with the burden on the Company, in a discharge case,
to prove otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.
However, I do find that a point came where and when the
grievant failed to meet her special duty as a Union officer to
take steps to end the "self help" involved.
When the grievant first saw or realized that a group of
employees had left their work stations during working hours to
congregate in the personnel office, she should have taken strong
and decisive measures to direct them to return to work and to
let the regular grievance procedure deal with the problem.
failed to do so.

She

I find she knew that the group had ceased work

as they followed her to the office, or at the latest when they
entered the office shortly after she arrived there.

In that
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respect she was wrong and defaulted on her responsibility to
the integrity of the contract and the grievance procedure.

And

she was wrong when she told management that the group of employees
"had a right to be there."

Additionally, she acted wrongly when

earlier, she invited two other employees to accompany her to
the office, apparently without the permission of or notice to
their supervisor.
That she characterized the position of the employees as
"an insurrection" is ambiguous.

It could have meant, as the

Company argues, that she was leading a work stoppage or concerted
demonstration.

It could have meant also that the other employees

were angry at the new parking rules

and that their anger had

reached the level of a figurative "insurrection."

Either inter-

pretation is colloquially logical and acceptable.

I find no

reason, in this colloquial setting, to rely on a precise dictionary meaning of the word "insurrection."

Again, with the

burden on the Company and in the absence of other clear and
convincing evidence linking the grievant to a leadership role
in the work stoppage, I am not persuaded that her use of the
word "insurrection" was an "admission against interest" that
establishes with requisite conclusiveness the grievant"s responsibility for instigating and/or

leading the stoppage.

For the foregoing reasons I do not find that the Company
had just cause to discharge the grievant.
as indicated, for some discipline.

But there are grounds,

The duty of a union official

to uphold the orderly processes of the contract is of the highest,
and because, in the respects indicated the grievant fell short
of full compliance with that duty, the discipline may be substantial, though short of discharge.
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Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Jane Abbruscato is reduced to a suspension for the period of
time involved. She shall be reinstated
but without back pay.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 20, 1986
STATE OF New York ) o c *
COUNTY OF New York )&c"I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Operating Engineer's Local 716
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #14 300 1089 86W

and
Delaware River Port Authority

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the ten working
days suspension of Lawrence Silver? If
not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on September 29, 1986 at which time
Mr. Silver, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The charge against the grievant and for which he was
suspended is that he "filed a false accident report in order to
have a previously diagnosed condition corrected under our Workers
Compensation Insurance Program."
This is a disciplinary case with the burden on the Employer to prove the charge by clear and convincing evidence.

The

Employer has not met that burden.
There is no evidence that the grievant did not have an
accident at work on

September 14, 1985.

There is no evidence

that his report that he missed a step on a ladder, causing him
to come down heavily on one leg was untrue.

There is no evidence

that he planned or "orchestrated" the accident.

The medical

evidence shows that upon examination by an Employer Physician,
the grievant was found to be suffering from a groin strain.
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He had reported that a pain in his lower left side resulted from
the accident off the ladder.

There is no evidence that the groin

pain or groin strain was not the proximate result of the misstep
off the ladder, as the grievant had stated in his accident report
It is undisputed that on February 12, two days before
the accident the grievant had been told by his own physician that
he had a hernia.

The hernia was discovered by the grievant's

physician as a result of an examination for a prostate condition.
It is the Employer's contention that the "groin strain"
that the grievant claims he suffered in the ladder accident was
really the pre-existing hernia condition; that it was therefore
not work related; that the grievant falsely

told the Employer

physician that he had no prior hernia problems in order to transform the pre-existing hernia condition into a work-related

injury

for Workers Compensation coverage, and that the grievant's motive
was to get any lost time changed to compensation and to save all
the accumulated sick time he had for payment at retirement.
While the Employer may have suspicions about the grievant's
behavior and motives, suspicions and speculation are not enough
to sustain a disciplinary action.
The critical medical evidence does not support the Employer's case.

The grievant's pre-existing hernia was diagnosed

as "asymptomatic," meaning that the grievant had no hernia symptoms.

So, there is no evidence that prior to the accident on the

ladder, the grievant experienced any prior swelling or discomfort
resulting from the hernia.

Yet, again based on the medical

evidence, following the accident he did experience pain and was

-3diagnosed by the Employer physician as suffering from a "groin
strain."

Absent any evidence to the contrary and there is none

in this record, the only probative conclusion that can be reached
is that the symptomatic groin strain resulted from the accident
and that it was either a new injury, different from the re-existing hernia; or was an aggravation of what had been an asymptomatic
hernia.
Either way, the grievant's accident report was not false.
He did not claim that he suffered a hernia from the ladder accident.

He reported only that he suffered pain in his side.

Again,

absent contrary evidence, I must conclude that he believed that
he had injured his groin in the misstep from the ladder or that
the groin pain was an aggravation of the pre-existing hernia.
The Employer has conceded that a work related accident
that aggravates a pre-existing non-work-related
compensatory under Workers Compensation.

condition is

And it is undisputed

that a new or different injury to the groin from a work-related
accident would also be compensatory.

So, again, either way the

grievant's accident report which generated a Workers Compensation
file and case was not false.
Indeed under the Employer's procedures, an injured employee does not make a claim for Workers Compensation.

Rather

he fills out an accident report which the Employer sends to its
carrier for Compensation processing.

Here the grievant filled

out the accident report as required, and, based on the credible
evidence in the record, I cannot find that the report was false
or fraudulent.
That in response to a question by the Employer's physician
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as to whether he ever had a hernia, the grievant answered "no"
untruthfully, is disturbing, of course.
evidence that he did so to hide

But unless there is

a groin strain that did not

result from the accident on the ladder, that
reprehensible

untruth, though

if willful, is immaterial to the validity of the

accident report and the Workers Compensation case.
Also, that the grievant was later denied compensation and
had the

hernia (and the prostate condition) corrected under his

Blue Cross-Blue Shield coverage, does not mean that he did not
have a legitimate reason to fill out an accident report, noting
"pain in the lower left side" when the accident occurred.

It is

the truth or falsity of that report that is in issue here, not
the subsequent Workers Compensation determination, from which an
appeal was not taken.
With the failure of the Employer's case to show that the
grievant did not suffer a groin injury from a misstep off a laddei
while at work, the grievant's interest in or concern over preserving his accumulated sick days are of no probative consequence.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the ten working days suspension of Lawrence Silver.
The suspension shall be expunged from his
record, and he shall be made whole for the
time lost.

.
,
, ino/:
DATED: October 6, 1986
STATE OF New York )
' cc •
COUNTY OF New York ) '

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #15 300 0168-85

IUE, Local 320
and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Mary Dixon? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held in Liverpool, New York on November 12,
1985 at which time Ms. Dixon, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and

Company filed post-hearing briefs.
The dispute is even narrower than the stipulated issue.
It is whether the fourth warning notice given the grievant for
excessive absenteeism and lateness (including "early outs") was
proper.

The Union does not contest the grievant's three active,

prior warnings (including a disciplinary suspension following the
third), nor does the Union contest the Company's policy of imposing the penalty of discharge for a fourth warning notice within
a relevant period of time.

The Union confines its case to a

challenge of the fourth warning notice, conceeding that if that
notice was justified, the grievant's discharge was proper.
Indeed, the dispute is further narrowed to whether the
absences, latenesses and "early outs" for which the grievant was
charged; which make up 14% of her scheduled time, and for which

-2-

she received the fourth warning notice, were properly charged
against her.

It is not disputed that a 14% absence/lateness

record over a period of fifty working days is excessive.

What

is disputed by the Union is the inclusion of certain absences,
and latenesses in that 14% for which, the Union claims the grievant

was or should have been excused.
The Company's Code of Conduct or absentee policy lists

the absences, etc. which are excused.
illness."

Included is "excused

The others are not relevant to this case.

In the instant case, the Union asserts that the Company
unfairly and arbitrarily refused to excuse the grievant from
absences and
illness.

tardiness which were "beyond her control", including

(And also including public transportation delays and car

breakdowns).

It argues that because the Company's policy of

issuing warnings is "corrective" in its intent, and that corrective action is inoperative in circumstances beyond the grievant's
control, those circumstances may not be included in the cumulative
attendance record and should have been excused.
I cannot agree with these arguments because they run
counter to certain well settled industrial relations pricinciples,
and because I find nothing in the contract, the Code of Conduct,
or practice which varies those principles.
First it is well settled that when an employee has accumulated an excessive record of absenteeism and latenesses, it is
proper for an employer to require that subsequent claims for illness be substantiated by a doctor's statement.
the grievant's three

Here, following

warning notices, I cannot find fault with

the Company's requirement that she produce medical documentation
of further illnesses in order to excuse these illnesses from her
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record.

So, as to that contention, I conclude that the griev-

ant's subsequent absences or tardiness due to "illness" which
were not medically documented, were properly included by the
Company in the 14% calculation.
It is also, in my opinion, universally well settled that
"corrective" action, in the form of progressive discipline, may
be applied to absences/latenesses, etc. that are both within or
beyond the employee's control.

This is based on the equally

well accepted proposition that an employer

has the right to

expect and require regular and reliable attendance from its
employees; that a pattern of excessive absenteeism/lateness, for
whatever reasons, is inconsistant with that rightful expectation;
and is actionable by corrective or progressive discipline, including the ultimate penalty of discharge.

Indeed, such a correc-

tive and progressive discipline policy must be applied regardless
of the reasons for that unsatisfactory attendance record, if an
ultimate discharge is to be upheld.

The mere use of the phrase

"corrective action" in the Code of Conduct does not transform or
limit the application of the Code or disciplinary action to those
instances of irregular attendance which the employee could have
controlled.

To do that, in my judgment, more explicit contract

language or Code language is required, for it would be a significant change in what is broadly and traditionally accepted in the
industrial relations community as the meaning and scope of
"corrective action."

In short, "corrective action" is tradition-

ally recognized as synonymous with "progressive discipline," and
I find nothing in this setting to change that recognition.

There-

fore, I find no contractual basis on which the grievant's un-
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substantiated illnesses or other absences or latenesses "beyond
her fault or control" should have been excused.
Against the back-drop of three prior, active warning notices
for an unsatisfactory attendance record, including a disciplinary
suspension, the grievant had a duty to make an extra and prudent
effort to obtain medical documentation of claimed illnesses, to
travel early enough to get to work on time; to arrange for alternative transportation if her car was unreliable, and to avoid
leaving work early except in the most compelling and also adequately documented circumstances.

(That she told her foreman that she

had to leave early "for personal reasons," and he permitted her to
do so, does not mean that she was "excused," within the meaning
of the Code of Conduct.)

She did not meet this duty.

Therefore, considering her chronic record of excessive absenteeism and lateness, as evidenced by her three prior warnings
and disciplinary suspension, her subsequert unsubstantiated illnesses and other circumstances "beyond her control" which caused
absences and other attendance problems, were and are prejudicial
to her in the proper application of discipline.

Hence, I must

reject the Union's argument that certain absences and latenesses
should have been excused.

The excessive 14% record therefore

stands, and as the Company had followed the progressive discipline
formula, a fourth warning notice was proper, and the grievant's
discharge is upheld.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
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There was just cause for the discharge
Mary Dixon.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 29, 1986
STATE OF New York ) s£. .
COUNTY OF New York )

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IUE, Radio and Machine Workers,
Local 1105

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 71E300003786

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharges of
Steven Vu and Felix Miller? If not, what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in New Orleans, Louisiana on May 22,
1986 at which time Messrs. Vu and Miller, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievants" and representatives of the above named
Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived, and

both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
The charge against the grievants for which they were discharged, is that they falsified their expense accounts for the
purpose of obtaining lodging expenses they did not incur.
As in all discharge cases, and especially where the charges
involve financial dishonesty, the burden is on the employer to
prove the charges by clear and convincing evidence.
Though the facts in the instant case raise legitimate
suspicions and involve questionable circumstances, I find that
the Company's case falls short of this requisite standard.
There is no doubt that the expense accounts submitted by
the grievants were inaccurate with regard to a third night of
lodging; that the expense accounts claimed reimbursement for a

-2third night in a motel when the grievants did not stay the third
night and did not incur a third night's expense; that the expense
accounts were so filed by the grievants with the Company after an
originally scheduled third night had been cancelled with the grievant's knowledge and after the motel gave them back their third
night's deposits.
However, I find the grievants' explanations to be plausible, believable and probable.

A contrary conclusion, namely

that they wilfully falsified their expense accounts to gain monies
to which they were not entitled is of course a possible finding,
but, based on the entire record too inconclusive to meet the test
of "clear and

convincing."

The grievants were on a work assignment which required
their stay in a motel.
overnight stays.

Their original schedule called for three

On checking in they paid for one night in ad-

vance and after that night
Before the third night

paid for the remaining two in advance.

the work unexpectedly finished or was dis-

continued, and a third night's stay was unnecessary.
notice

On short

the grievants left the motel before the third night, at

which time the motel returned to them their third night's advance
payment.
The grievants explain that after the first night, or before the scheduled third night had been cancelled they had prepared their lodging expense account in advance, and that this had
always been their practice.
cancelled

When the third night was abruptly

they returned to the Company headquarters, arriving

in the early morning hours, and left the prepared expense accounts,
still showing a third nights lodging, forgetting or neglecting to
make the appropriate changes.
I am not prepared to conclude that the grievants falsified
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| this testimony.

Clearly the grievants did not hide the fact that

:

they spent only two nights in the motel. They attached the motel
.
: bills to their expense accounts. Those bills showed only two
nights of motel expense.

By their own action the grievants had

disclosed to the Company that their lodging expense was limited
to two days, regardless of what their expense account claimed.
In other words, any plan of the grievants to deceive could be
readily uncovered by the very documents they filed.

Hence, I do

not believe that they set out to deceive or defraud.
Also, because the original schedule called for three
nights, the expense account reference to a third night in the
motel did not have a fictitious origin.
| ipatorily, it was correct.

Originally, but antic-

So, in the absence of any evidence

in refutation, I accept their testimony that they made out the
expense account in advance, anticipating three night's stay and,
considering the short notice of the cancellation of the work before the third night, their arrival back at Company headquarters
in the early hours of the morning, and their fatigue at the time,
I accept their testimony that they forgot or neglected to correct
their expense accounts before filing them at that hour.
Additionally, I do not think it unreasonable, under the
particular circumstances of this case, for the grievants to await
an expected, routine audit of their expense account to make the
needed corrections.
The evidence 'On the regular audit procedure is basically
undisputed.

Routinely, an auditor calls employees into the office

and with the affected employee, makes changes in the expense accounts, including disallowances.
discipline.

Errors have not resulted in

Though previous audits may not have dealt with such

a large inaccuracy as an additional nights lodging, I cannot conclude that the grievants falsified their reliance on an expected

-4audit to correct their accounts.

Especially so when as previous-

ly noted, the documents they filed with their expense accounts dis
closed the discrepancy and inaccuracy and certainly would have
prompted such an audit.

In short, I believe the grievants did

not act dishonestly because, by their own simultaneous acts, any
such dishonesty would have been easily discovered.
The Company makes much of what is considers as an untruthful answer by grievant Vu, when, in response to an investigatory
question "how many nights (he) stayed in the motel," he replied
"three."

I do not consider this fatal.

English is not his native language.

Vu is Chinese, and

I consider it an acceptable

possibility that he did not understand the question precisely;
that he confused the number of days in the motel (correctly three)
with the number of nights; or that he confused the original plan
to stay three nights with what actually happened.

Again, his

answer could be interpreted as prejudicial to him, but a nonprejudicial explanation is also logical and reasonable under all
the circumstances of this case.

These divergent, albeit logical

interpretations mean that a prejudicial interpretation has not
been clearly and convincingly established.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the discharge
of Steven Vu and Felix Miller. They shall
be reinstated with full benefits and back
pay less their earnings from gainful employment, if any, during the period of their discharges .

DATED: July 27, 1986

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)
) ss - :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Boston Globe Employees Association
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1130 1364 85

and
The_Globe_Newspaper_Company
The stipulated issue is:

Did the Employer violate Article VI Paragraph 4 by its failure to start Robert
Doherty at a pay rate of $450.25 a week
at his date of hire, March 3, 1985. If
so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Boston, Massachusetts on February
20, 1986 at which time Mr. Doherty, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and
Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken and both sides filed

post-hearing briefs.
Article VI Paragraph 4 reads:
Length of Service Steps
The word "year" or "years" as used in this
article in relation to step raises shall
mean year or years of experience in comparable work. "Comparable work" shall not
be limited to the Newspaper and/or Communications Industry. Experience, as used in
this Agreement, means employment by any
daily newspaper of general circulation, in
a comparable job classification, or by any
recognized news or photo syndicate or press
association, or comparable experience on any
recognized periodical of general circulation,
or for commercial positions, in a comparable
position for a comparable organization or
newspaper.
The grievant is a custodian.

When he began work full time

he was paid the starting rate for that classification of $275.51
a week.

It is the Union's contention that because of the grie-

vant ' s prior experience as a custodian in previous jobs elsewhere
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he was entitled to the top of the custodian rate^ namely $450.25
a week, under the foregoing contract provision.

There is no dis-

pute that the grievant had no experience in the various newspaper
job classifications and/or in the communications industry or in
comparable jobs with any recognized news, photo syndicate or
press association or periodical within the meaning of Article VI
Paragraph 4 of the contract.

The only question is whether as a

custodian, he occupies a "commercial position" within the meaning of that section of the contract, and at the the time of his
hire, possessed prior experience in a "comparable position" with
a "comparable organization."
By its terms Article VI Paragraph 4 does not cover all
persons employed by the Employer.

Clearly it covers only those

with prior newspaper, communications, news and/or photo experience
with other newspapers or periodicals, and it covers other employee
falling within "commercial" classifications.

Had it been intended

to cover all bargaining unit employees, I am satisfied it would
have said so.

Instead of setting forth delineations among em-

ployees with prior newspaper and photo experience and those in
commercial positions, it would have provided for length of service
pay steps for "all employees."

Indeed, in other sections of the

contract, the parties, have demonstrated a knowledge of and abilit
to express coverage for all the bargaining unit employees.
The remaining question is therefore whether the custodian
position is a "commercial position" within the meaning and intent
of Article VI Paragraph 4.
tional meaning of

I must conclude it is not.

The tradi-

a "commercial position" includes business,

clerical and other recognized administrative jobs with a newspaper.

It is well recognized that commonly used terms should be

— 3—

given their traditional meaning, unless a specific different
definition or other evidence of a different meaning is shown.
That exception has not been demonstrated in this case.
The Employer has presented persuasive reasons for and explanations of why Article VI Paragraph 4 does not and was not intended to cover custodians.

It points out that length of service

pay steps have been necessary to attract journalists, editorial
staff, and clerical and administrative personnel to jobs with
this newspaper.

Competition for those types of employees warrant

pay recognition for comparable experience gained elsewhere.
explanation is unrefuted.

This

Also unrefuted is evidence adduced by

the Employer that no such competition exists for custodians, and
that there is and has been a ready and available supply of employees for custodian positions without any need to grant pay
levels based on prior experience as a custodian.
However, even if it is assumed that the language "commercial
positions" is ambiguous and may lend itself to an unusual interpretation which would include custodians, the evidence before me
still supports :the Employer's contention.

Where a contract phrase

is ambiguous; where its meaning is unclear; and where it may be
subject to different interpretations, the arbitrator looks to
past practice for clarification and for an evidentiary indication,
by the practice of the parties, of what the language was intended
to mean.

There is clear evidence of past practice in this case

which probatively negates the Union's interpretation.

The un-

disputed fact is that for all the many years of this collective
bargaining relationship, no custodian has ever received a pay
rate based on prior custodian experience elsewhere under Article
VI Paragraph 4 of the contract.

I hold that this lengthy and un-
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varied past practice supports the interpretation that the phrase
"commercial positions" in Article VI Paragraph 4 does not include
the custodian classification.
With that holding, it is unnecessary to decide whether the
grievant's prior experience as a custodian meets the experience
qualifications of Article VI Paragraph 4.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD;
The Employer did not violate Article VI Paragraph 4 by its failure to start Robert Doherty
at a pay rate of $450.25 a week at his date of
hire, March 3, 1985.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 12, 1986
STATE OF
New York )
COUNTY OF New York) S" ""
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION'ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America
Local 1693

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #5230 0235 86

and
Henry Vogt Machine Company

The stipulated issue is:
/

Did the Company violate
refusing to allow James
Headley out of the Tool
tion? If so, what ought

the Basic Agreement by
A. Dugard to bump Arthur
Crib Store Keeper posithe remedy be?

Did the Company violate the Basic Agreement by
not awarding the Cl. 6 Truck Driver ob to either
Odie Hunt, Marion Jeffries or John Schneider?
If so, what ought the remedy be?
A hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky on September
17, 1986 at which time representatives of the above-named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived and each side filed a post hearing brief.
Both issues in this case involve the ability of the grievants to perform the job sought, by a lateral bump (in the first
issue) or by a bid (in the second issue).
Under the first issue, the relevant contract provision is
Article 4.6d(2)(b) which reads:
An employee in a sharing unit in which a reduction in force is taking place, or who is
otherwise displaced, will have the opportunity to avail himself to a job in the order
listed below:
(b) The job of the least senior employee on
any shift in the plant in a higher classification on which the employee has been permanently assigned with satisfactory performance
for a period of twenty (20) work days, or the
same classification, or a lower classification
through classification 5, on which the employee has been permanently assigned with satisfactory performance for a period exceeding twenty

-2(20) work days or is otherwise qualified by
his prior work experience, provided the displaced employee has greater seniority than
the employee he would displace.
The grievant, James A. Dugard, laid off from the classification 8 Tool Grinder "B", sought to bump the less senior employee, Arthur Headley, in the job Tool Crib Store Keeper, classification 8.

As such it was an attempted lateral bump.

It is un-

disputed that the grievant had not been previously and permanently assigned to the Tool Crib Store Keeper job for "a period exceeding twenty (20) working days."

The dispute therefore is

narrowed to whether the grievant was "otherwise qualified by his
prior work experience."
The record before me establishes that the phrase "otherwise
qualified by ... prior work experience" means an ability to step
into the disputed job and perform it satisfactorily without training or an on the job "break in" period of other than a minor
period.

Indeed, this practice is supported by Article 4.6d(3) of

the contract which provides for on the job training only where
the classification involved is at Grade 4 or less.

Here we are

concerned with classification 8.
The Union has offered considerable evidence concerning the
grievant's other work positions including

that of Tool Crib Dis-

penser which the Union claims has given him the requisite experience and training to perform the Tool Crib Store Keeper job
satisfactorily.

The Company's evidence and testimony sharply

dispute this conclusion.

Frankly, I find the respective positions

to be offsetting and hence inconclusive.

As such, the Union,

with the burden of proving its case, has fallen short of establishing the grievant's "qualifications" by other work assignments
within the meaning of the critical language.
What is relevant, is the period of time that the grievant
was temporarily assigned to the Tool Crib Store Keeper job.

His
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temporary assignments, cumulatively, amounted to about 44 hours.
This is a period of experience relevant to his ability to perform the job if assigned it permanently.

However, I am not pre-

pared to substitute my judgment for that of the Company that 44
hours is not enough to either equal "more than 20 work days" of
a permanent assignment, or enough to establish a "qualification"
within the meaning of the contract, especially when, based on
practice,

no employee with as few hours of temporary assignment

has been permitted to bump.
This is not to say that the grievant does not know some
important things about the Tool Crib or even about the Tool Crib
Store Keeper job.

Rather it is to say that the Company's deter-

mination that his other work experience and his period of temporary assignment were not enough to qualify him to assume the
full responsibilities of the job, cannot be faulted as arbitrary,
capricious or even evidentially unreasonable.

As the grievant

acquires more experience in the job by temporary assignments or
comparable experience, he will be accumulating the requisite
experience that should qualify him in the future for a chance as
a Tool Crib Store Keeper.
On the second issue, I find no fault with the Company's
rejection of grievant Marion Jeffries.

Jeffries had an official,

medical work restriction, limiting the amount of walking and climbing he should undertake or be required to perform.

Walking was

not to exceed 200 yards, and climbing or "scaffolding" was prohibited .
Again the evidence and testimony on how much walking was
required of the truck driver operator was

contradictory.

Yet,

on balance, I am persuaded that the job does and would require
amounts of walking in excess of the 200 yard limitation, and hence
if awarded to Jeffries would be in express violation of that

-4official limitation.

Accordingly, the rejection of Jeffries' bid

was not improper or violative of the contract.

That the Company

may have known that Jeffries has been walking in excess of

200

yards on other jobs may be a violation of the limitation as to
those j obs, but cannot constitute an elimination of that restriction or create a different medical condition, when bids for a
different job (here as Truck Driver), are considered.

In short,

I cannot find that an official, physical and medical work restriction has been eliminated by the theory of estoppel.

The grievant's

remedy is to require the Company to reduce the amount of walking
in his incumbent jobs, so that the restriction is

properly

respected.
However, the most senior of the bidders was Odie Hunt, and
I do not find that the Company had reasonable grounds to bypass
or disqualify him.

With that determination, the other less senior

bidders need not be considered.

The relevant contract provision

is Article 4.5g which reads:
When there are two or more eligible, qualified
bidders as evaluated by Management in accordance with Article 4.2a and 4.2b, for a posted
job opening, the eligible, qualified bidders
shall then be considered in order of seniority.
Management may then determine by interview or
review of records of the senior, eligible,
qualified bidder if he can read required blueprints, or has any physical, mental or any
other disqualifying deficiency which would prevent satisfactory performance on the job. If a
deficiency is noted in the interview or records
review, the bidder will be disqualified and
Management will proceed to the next senior,
eligible, qualified bidder.
When the Company selects the senior, eligible,
qualified bidder without a disqualifying deficiency, that employee will be given a trial
period (not training period) not to exceed 20
work days on the specific job opening. If the
employee is awarded a Trainee job posting, he
will be given a 20 work day trial period. In
either case of "trial periods" the employee may
be revoed from that job and returned to his
former job, if within the trial period his
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aptitude, capability, or performance is unsatisfactory. Any employee returned to his
former job will not be eligible to bid on
any subsequent posting for 26 weeks.
Hunt had regularly filled in on the job, covering for vacations and illnesses.

He drove both the large and small truck. He

had work experience as a helper on the trucks.

That he was dis-

qualified because he was "not as proficient as a qualified operator" when he filled in is not a disqualifying factor.

The con-

tract does not require an immediate proficiency in bidding situations.

Indeed, the provision in Article 4.5g for a "trial perioc.

not to exceed 20 work days on the specified job opening" shows
that full proficiency is not expected immediately.

Also, an em-

ployee who has filled in from time to time, as in the case of the
grievant cannot be expected to immediately know the locations of
of all the stops and points of pickup and delivery.

The trial

period is accorded for that as well as other reasons, including
a determination of "aptitude, capability and performance."
That the grievant was disqualified because he failed to
make a pickup where a business had moved from one location .to
another, and for one traffic violation arising out of either
"ignoring" a traffic sign (as alleged by the Company) or his
"confusion" over the sign (as alleged by the Union) mean that the
Company requires errorless performance with no margin for mistakes
I think that is unreasonable and that the grievant's extensive
work experience on the trucks involved qualified him for at least
the contractual trial period.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARDS:
[1] The Company did not violate the Basic
Agreement by refusing to allow James
A. Dugard to bump Arthur Headley out
of the Tool Crib Store Keeper position.

•
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[2] The Company violated the Basic Agreement
by not awarding the Cl. 6 Truck Driver
job to Odie Hunt. He shall be given the
contractual trial period on the job and
made whole for wages lost.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 13, 1986
STATE OF New York)
.
COUNTY OF New York) ° " "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

